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INTRODUCTION
Here we are, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, using
a model of legal education that was developed in the latter part of the
nineteenth. Since that time, the nature of legal practice has changed,
the concept of law has changed, the nature of academic inquiry has
changed, and the theory of education has changed. Professional
training programs in other fields have been redesigned many times to
reflect current practice, theory, and pedagogy, but we legal educators
are still doing the same basic thing we were doing one hundred and
thirty years ago. Many law professors are conscientious and devoted
teachers, and quite a few are inspired ones, but their efforts are
constrained and hobbled by an educational model that treats the
entire twentieth century as little more than a passing annoyance.
There has, of course, been a certain amount of lower-level
change in the model of legal education during this period. Law schools
have added, although not integrated, clinical programs into the
remainder of the curriculum. They have also introduced courses
reflecting new developments in law, although they rarely have
penetrated the sacrosanct first year. Moreover, the demographics of
law schools have kept pace with those of other university
departments. Law schools' treat women, minorities, and gays is just as
well, and sometimes better than other graduate school programs.
Further, discrimination against Jews, which was rampant when the
law school program was developed, is barely an institutional memory
at present.1 Law school buildings have been regularly refurbished or
rebuilt and are often some of the most modern and opulent facilities
on campus; they are filled with up-to-date libraries, state-of-the-art
audio-visual equipment, and sleek internet terminals. But the basic
educational approach that law schools use remains essentially
unchanged from the one that C.C. Langdell introduced at Harvard in
the years following the Civil War.
Few contemporary legal educators even attempt to offer a
rationale for this situation.2 What one sometimes hears is that the
current law school curriculum teaches students to "think like
1. See DANIEL FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL ASSAULT
ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 52-59 (1997) (noting that the representation of Jews in the
American legal academy is quite extensive relative to their proportion of the general population,
so much so that any shift away from current means of selection in the direction of proportional
representation would be highly disadvantageous to them).
2. See Russell Weaver, Langdell's Legacy: Living with the Case Method, 36 VILL. L. REV.
517, 547-61 (1991) (canvassing justifications for the case method, almost all written prior to
World War II). Weaver himself is critical of the case method. Id. at 561-96.
610 [Vol. 60:2:609
2007] WHAT'S WRONG WITH LANGDELL'S METHOD 611
lawyers."3 Any systematic demonstration that such an outdated
approach to legal education develops skills that are central to the very
different world of modern legal practice would be interesting to see,
but no such demonstration has been offered. More often, the
justification for resisting change-if not in print then certainly in
faculty meetings and hallway conversations-is this: "If it ain't broke,
don't fix it." Apparently, the primary indication that law schools are
not "broke" is that they have managed to place themselves astride the
entrance to a highly prestigious, influential, and lucrative profession,
and thus can teach whatever they want and maintain their economic
viability. However, this fortunate position hardly justifies the
retention of an educational approach that has not been re-thought for
a century, and that undermines the best efforts of its practitioners,
including those who attempt to defend it.
The great irony of modern legal education is that it is not only
out of date, but that it was out of date one hundred years ago. The
1880s and 1890s were a period of enormous social and intellectual
change in the United States and, more generally, Western society.
New modes of governance, concepts of law, academic disciplines, and
theories of education all made their appearances at this time, each
shaping and inspiring the modern era. Langdell's design for legal
education, although innovative in its own time and on its own terms,
is more closely connected to modes of thought that prevailed in the
Renaissance, the Middle Ages, and ancient Greece and Rome than to
our current ways of thinking. Admittedly, it may be unreasonable to
expect people to be entirely au courant. New developments do not
always last, and new ideas do not always prevail; events that seem
significant when viewed through that marvelous instrument that
doctors call a retrospectiscope often seem unreliable or insignificant at
the time they first appear. Yet by 1914, a reasonable date for the
beginning of the modern era, 4 legal educators knew, or at least should
have known, that all of the premises of the approach they were using
had been overturned some twenty or thirty years before. And here we
are, over one hundred years into that modern era, still wedded to-or
3. Charles Eliot, Langdell and the Law School, 33 HARV. L. REV. 518, 523-24 (1920); Mark
Spiegel, Theory and Practice in Legal Education: An Essay on Clinical Education, 34 UCLA L.
REV. 577, 582-83 (1987); Weaver, supra note 2, at 549.
4. In August of 1914, with Europe sliding rapidly into war, Sir Edward Grey, "watching
from the windows of the Foreign Office the lights springing out in the dusk, said to a friend, 'The
lamps are going out all over Europe; we shall not see them lit again in our lifetime.' " JOHN
BUCHAN, THE PEOPLE'S KING, GEORGE V: A NARRATIVE OF TWENTY-FIVE YEARS 98 (1935). See
generally ROBERT MUSIL, THE MAN WITHOUT QUALITIES (Sophie Wilkins trans., 1995) (novel
about the onset of the modern era, set in 1913-14).
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perhaps enchanted by-that same approach. We are trapped inside a
pedagogic fossil, marvelously preserved from a vanished era by the
adamantine rock of a licensed monopoly.
Recent scholarship about legal education includes several
efforts to rehabilitate Langdell. A number of authors argue that he
was more sophisticated than his traditional image as the arch-
formalist, or ur-formalist, would suggest, more cognizant of the
evolving character of law, more concerned with the realities of
practice, more flexible in his interactions with his students.5 In fact,
Langdell does not need rehabilitation; his legacy as a path-breaking
legal educator is secure. Langdell, together with Harvard President
Charles Eliot,6 established law school as a three-year graduate
program, required an undergraduate education as a prerequisite,
imposed admissions standards, divided the curriculum into discrete
courses, initiated the use of primary sources as pedagogic materials,
and demanded regular examination of the students.7 None of these
features are likely to change, and there is little argument for changing
them, since they are consistent with the structure of professional
training in virtually every other field.
The problem lies with Langdell's substantive innovations-the
case method, the so-called Socratic style of teaching, and the common
law curriculum. These were also path-breaking, and generally well-
suited to the period immediately following the Civil War. Like his
structural innovations, they placed Harvard Law School on a course
that distinguished it from all other law programs of its day. By about
1914, these substantive innovations had displaced other approaches to
legal education and achieved a dominance that has continued to the
5. LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 466-72 (3d ed. 2005) (more
sophisticated); WILLIAM LAPIANA, LOGIC AND EXPERIENCE: THE ORIGIN OF MODERN LEGAL
EDUCATION 55-78 (1994) (more concerned with the realities of practice); Bruce Kimball, "Warn
Students That I Entertain Heretical Opinions, Which They Are Not to Take as Law" The
Inception of Case Method Teaching in the Classrooms of the Early C.C. Langdell, 1870-1883, 17
LAW & HIST. REV. 57, 66-77 (1999) (more flexible); Anthony Sebok, Misunderstanding Positivism,
93 MICH. L. REV. 2054, 2078-87 (1995) (more cognizant of the evolving character of law); Marcia
Speziale, Langdell's Concept of Law as Science: The Beginning of Anti-Formalism in American
Legal Theory, 5 VT. L. REV. 1, 3 (1980) (more sophisticated, more cognizant of the evolving
character of law).
6. See Anthony Chase, The Birth of the Modern Law School, 23 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 329,
332-39 (1979) (arguing that Eliot was primarily responsible for the development of the Harvard
Law School approach). This would not be surprising; Langdell was a New York lawyer at the
time of his appointment, but Eliot was one of the leading educators of the entire era.
7. WILLIAM C. CHASE, THE AMERICAN LAW SCHOOL AND THE RISE OF ADMINISTRATIVE
GOVERNMENT 26-27 (1982); ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM
THE 1850S TO THE 1980S 35-50 (1983).
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present.8 Unfortunately, the case method, Socratic teaching, and the
common law curriculum were all seriously out-of-date by the time of
their triumph. They no longer comported with the practice of law or
the theories of law, society and education. To rely on the Langdellian
approach by 1914 was educationally irresponsible, a failure to keep
pace with current events and current thinking; it was not even true to
the spirit of the Langdell's own innovations, which had been entirely
au courant when they were devised in the 1870s.
Nearly one hundred years have passed since 1914, of course,
and we still rely on Langdell's substantive innovations. Why has there
been so little curricular change over such a long and eventful period of
time? One can understand that law schools in the early decades of the
twentieth century, having just adopted the Harvard model as a
thrilling innovation in legal education, would be reluctant to admit
that it had fallen out of date and would be institutionally incapable of
undertaking another broad revision of their teaching program. But
how can we explain the continued survival of a professional training
program that is so obsolete, so discontinuous with the profession that
it allegedly prepares its students to enter?
One explanation, ironically, is its very obsolescence. If the
standard law school curriculum were merely out-of-date, if it had been
created forty or sixty years ago, for example, its age would count
against it. In fact, the Langdellian model weathered a sustained
attack that the Legal Realists and others mounted between forty and
sixty years after its creation. 9 Continuing on for another seventy years
or so, it has ceased to be viewed as a particular approach to legal
education-as last generation's innovation-and has become a
venerable institution that gains gravity and prestige from its
antiquity. As such, this approach has the remarkable capacity to make
suggested changes seem jejune and to reduce reform initiatives to
quixotic ventures that can be dismissed with knowing guffaws from its
wiser, more experienced supporters. We are generally not a society
8. CHASE, supra note 7, at 41-76; FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 470-71; LAPIANA, supra note
5, at 79-109; STEVENS, supra note 7, at 73-91; Weaver, supra note 2, at 541-43.
9. See, e.g., JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 100-07 (Anchor Books 1970)
(1930) (attacking formalism and Langdellian curriculum as pseudo-science); Felix S. Cohen,
Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 COLUM. L. REV. 809, 821-34 (1935)
(attacking formalism and Langdellian curriculum as arid conceptualism); William 0. Douglas, A
Functional Approach to the Law of Business Associations, 23 ILL. L. REV. 673, 674-76 (1928-29)
(same, specifically in business law). On the legal realistic movement generally, and the reasons
for its ultimate demise, see generally JOHN HENRY SCHLEGEL, AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM AND
EMPIRICAL SOCIAL SCIENCE (1995); WILLIAM TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALIST
MOVEMENT (1973); Grant Gilmore, Legal Realism: Its Cause and Cure, 70 YALE L.J. 1037 (1961).
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that venerates tradition, 10 but Langdell's approach is so old,1" and has
been so immutable, that it seems less a tradition than a fact of nature.
The structure of the modern law school provides a second
explanation for the continued survival of the Langdellian curriculum.
Law schools make enough money that they often subsidize their
parent institutions, and they rarely make demands on their resources.
They do so while paying their faculty members salaries that are
positively bountiful by academic standards. Why mess with an
institution that corresponds so closely to the average university
administrator's definition of success? And if institutional incentives
for the university discourage educational change, the personal
incentives for the faculty discourage education in general. All of the
earthly rewards that a faculty member can obtain-salary raises,
summer grants, chaired professorships, competing offers, speaking
engagements, and conference invitations-depend on scholarly
production, not on teaching. The super-heated competition that U.S.
News & World Report has engendered among law schools only
exacerbates this trend.' 2 Under these circumstances, why should a
faculty member devote time or mental energy to changing a familiar
10. See PETER L. BERGER, THE HERETICAL IMPERATIVE: CONTEMPORARY POSSIBILITIES OF
RELIGIOUS AFFIRMATION 12-26 (1979) (contrasting modernity with traditional pre-modern
society); FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN 323-27 (1992) (describing
the decline in traditional community brought on by the rise of liberal capitalism); 1 KARL R.
POPPER, THE OPEN SOCIETY AND ITS ENEMIES: THE SPELL OF PLATO 188-89 (5th ed. rev. 1966)
(1945) (construing the rise of philosophy as a process of questioning previous theories and
traditions). See generally 1 JURGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION:
REASON AND THE RATIONALIZATION OF SOCIETY (Thomas McCarthy trans., 1984) (viewing the
modern world view as the rationalization of traditional modes of thought and social practice);
Anthony Giddens, Living in a Post-Traditional Society, in ULRICH BECK, ANTHONY GIDDENS &
SCOTT LASH, REFLEXIVE MODERNIZATION: POLITICS, TRADITION AND AESTHETICS IN THE MODERN
SOCIAL ORDER 56 (1994) (describing the advent of a global post-traditional world at the end of
the twentieth century). This so-called detraditionalization has been questioned by some
observers. See HANS-GEORG GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD 277-307 (Joel Weinsheimer &
Donald G. Marshall trans., 2d rev. ed. 1989) (1960) (arguing that reason can coexist with
authority and tradition). See generally Paul Heelas, On Things Not Being Worse, and the Ethic of
Humanity, in DETRADITIONALIZATION 200 (Paul Heelas, Scott Lash & Paul Morris eds., 1996)
(claiming that the development of an "ethic of humanity" has compensated for the reduced
influence of tradition in modern society).
11. Many traditions are not particularly old. See generally THE INVENTION OF TRADITION
(Eric Hobsbawm & Terrence Ranger eds. 1992) (collection of essays examining the appearance
and establishment of traditions, particularly those practices popularly regarded as "traditions"
which have a brief history or were consciously created).
12. See Symposium, The Next Generation of Law School Rankings, 81 IND. L.J. 1 (2006);
David C. Yamada, Same Old, Same Old: Law School Rankings and the Affirmation of
Hierarchy, 31 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 249, 251 (1997).
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and expected approach to teaching? And why should a law school dean
encourage any faculty member to do so?
There is at least one more explanation for legal education's lack
of change, and this explanation serves as the starting point for this
Article. It involves our interpretation of the past. When we look back
at something created in a prior period, it often acquires a false
appearance of modernity because we interpret it according to our
current understandings. This phenomenon does not occur with
something truly alien to us, like Babylonian mythology or Mayan
architecture, but it often happens in relation to ideas and institutions
to which we are connected by a continuous historical experience. As
classical scholars have pointed out, texts from ancient Greece are
more foreign to our sensibility than they seem to be because their
authors possessed an unfamiliar concept of honor, 13 or because they
relied on an unfamiliar concept of virtue, 14 or even because their
brains functioned in different ways. 15 We tend to overlook or
underestimate these differences because the stories are so familiar;
they have been told almost continuously during the period that
separates us from their originators. Similarly, when we look back at
the law school curriculum that Langdell instituted in the 1870's and
1880's, it seems more contemporary, more relevant than it actually is,
because we interpret its antiquated features in modern terms. The
continuous historical experience is particularly intense in this case
because we still use this same curriculum. Our failure to progress
paints the Langdellian original with false colors of modernity,
misleading us into thinking that the rationales for this curriculum
correspond to our current understanding of law, society, and
education.
The first three Parts of this Article attempt to reestablish the
historical and conceptual distance between late nineteenth century
America and the present time. They demonstrate how distant
Langdell's conception is from our current sensibility, how outdated his
understanding of the law and legal pedagogy has become in the
intervening one hundred and thirty years or so. Part I discusses
common law, first describing its importance in the legal system of the
1870s and its subsequent decline as a result of the administrative
state, and then describing the concept of common law that prevailed in
the 1870s and the refutation of this concept through historical
13. M.I. FINLEY, THE WORLD OF ODYSSEUS 113-22 (2d. rev. ed. 1979).
14. ALASDAIR MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 121-45 (2d ed. 1984).
15. JULIAN JAYNES, THE ORIGIN OF CONSCIOUSNESS IN THE BREAKDOWN OF THE BICAMERAL
MIND 69-83, 255-92 (1976).
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analysis. Part II addresses Langdell's and Eliot's claim that law is a
form of natural science, and contrasts this contention with the
currently accepted view that law is more closely related to the social
sciences. Part III details Langdell's conception of education,
comparing it with the educational thinking that developed in the
succeeding decades. Having shown that the Langdellian model is
severely out-of-date on many different fronts, the Article, in Part IV,
offers some preliminary suggestions for a law school curriculum that
would be relevant to the twenty-first century practice of law, and thus
a more effective means of both professional training and academic
inquiry.
The point of all of this is not to excoriate Langdell, but to
interrogate ourselves. Langdell was up-to-date in his time and indeed
a true visionary in several areas; he cannot be blamed for his failure to
fully anticipate subsequent historical and conceptual developments.
But the events that lay twenty or forty years in his future now lie a
hundred years in our past. Had Langdell devised a curriculum in 1870
that failed to recognize that the United States was an independent
country, or taught his students the land law of the feudal system, he
would have been open to the same criticism that can be applied to the
current model of legal education.
I. LAW AND COMMON LAW
To Langdell, law meant common law, and he originally
organized the entire curriculum as a set of mandatory courses devoted
to different bodies of common law doctrine. By the 1880s he had
retrenched-showing the flexibility that some modern scholars would
attribute to him-and limited the mandatory program to the first
year, where it remains to this day. 16 The elective character of the
upper-class curriculum gradually allowed the introduction of non-
common law courses, but Langdell insisted that real law was common
law, and that only "real" law should be allowed in the crucial first-year
program. The story of Ernst Freund's exclusion from the
"Harvardized" University of Chicago Law School is illustrative. 17
When President William Rainey Harper of Chicago decided to add a
modern law school to his university in 1902, he appealed to James
Barr Ames, Langdell's successor and loyal acolyte, who was then the
Dean of Harvard. Ames agreed to delegate one of his acolytes, Joseph
Beale, to take Chicago in hand, but hesitated when he learned that
16. CHASE, supra note 7, at 32.
17. Id. at 47-59; STEVENS, supra note 7, at 39-40.
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Freund, already on the faculty, harbored the outrageous belief that
the law school should teach international law in the first year and
offer electives on taxation, constitutional law, and jurisprudence.
Harvard could not possibly entrust Chicago with so valuable a
Langdellian as Beale, Ames insisted, until the law school banished
Freund and taught only real law; that is, English and American
common law.
These events occurred in 1902. Since then, both the law and
our understanding of law have changed enormously. Statutory
enactments have displaced much of the common law, while the
mythology of common law has been displaced by a genuinely historical
account of its origins. Judicial decisions are no longer the primary
source of law in our legal system, nor are they regarded as the essence
of what law should be. This is not to say that common law is not
important, or that students can ignore it. But other forms of law are
now more important, and students should not ignore those either, or
treat them as conceptually inferior. If we continue to describe
ourselves as possessing a common law system, it is because most other
advanced industrial nations do not rely on common law at all, not
because common law occupies the central pragmatic and conceptual
position that it did in Langdell's day.
A. Common Law and the Advent of the Administrative State
When Langdell developed his curriculum in the 1870s and
early 1880s, his assumption that American law consisted essentially of
common law was tenable. It remained so until 1887, when Congress
passed the Interstate Commerce Act, creating the first federal
regulatory agency.18 The Act was triggered by the severely
disadvantageous contractual terms that railroads imposed upon
businesses, particularly small-town businesses, which they were able
to impose as a result of their enormous economic power. Congress
remedied this disadvantage by displacing the common law in the area
of railroad shipping rates with regulatory price-setting.' 9 Of course,
the significance of this Act was not necessarily apparent at the time. 20
18. Interstate Commerce Act, ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of at 49 U.S.C.).
19. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 329-40; THOMAS K. MCCRAw, PROPHETS OF
REGULATION: CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS, JAMES M. LANDIS, ALFRED E. KAHN
60-65 (1984); STEPHEN SKOWRONEK, BUILDING A NEW AMERICAN STATE: THE EXPANSION OF
NATIONAL ADMINISTRATIVE CAPACITIES, 1877-1920, 121-60 (1982); Robert L. Rabin, Federal
Regulation in Historical Perspective, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1189, 1197-1208 (1986).
20. In 1897, the Supreme Court eviscerated one section of the Act in ICC v. Alabama
Midland Ry. Co., 168 U.S. 144 (1897). But in the first decade of the twentieth century, Congress
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By 1914, however, the Antitrust Acts, the Federal Trade Commission
Act, the Federal Reserve Act, and a wide range of similar federal
enactments cut increasingly wider swaths out of the common law. 21
These statutes were products of the Progressive Movement in the
United States, and it should have been apparent even at this time
that they had changed the landscape of American law in a manner
that would not be easily reversed. 22 To be sure, the Supreme Court
bridled at these developments and attempted to cut them back them
in a few discrete areas,23 but by 1914, it was clear to everyone that the
regulation spawned by the Progressive Movement would define the
contours of the American legal system for a long time to come. 24
enacted no fewer than three separate laws (with more to follow subsequently) that expanded the
Interstate Commerce Commission's authority-the Elkins Act of 1903, ch. 708, 32 Stat. 847
(repealed), the Hepburn Act of 1906, ch. 3591, 34 Stat. 584 (repealed), and the Mann-Elkins Act
of 1910, ch. 309, 36 Stat. 539 (repealed). MCCRAW, supra note 19, at 62-63. This is not to suggest
that all this regulation was effective in disciplining the railroads. It may have worked to their
advantage. See generally GABRIEL KOLKO, RAILROADS AND REGULATION 1877-1916 (1965)
(arguing that, since the railroads did not have control over the economy, they benefited from the
protection of the federal government that came with regulation). But whatever their effect,
statutes and their implementing regulations had definitively displaced common law in the
railroad industry by 1914.
21. Federal Reserve Act, ch. 6, 38 Stat. 251 (1913) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 12 U.S.C. (2006)); Sherman Antitrust Act, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2006)); Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, 38 Stat. 717 (1914)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58 (2006)). For a general discussion, see generally
RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AGE OF REFORM: FROM BRYAN TO F.D.R. (1955) (examining the
primary American reform movements occurring from the 1890s until the end of the New Deal).
22. For discussions of the Progressive Movement in various policy areas, see SAMUEL
HABER, EFFICIENCY AND UPLIFT: SCIENTIFIC MANAGEMENT IN THE PROGRESSIVE ERA, 1890-1920
(1964) (scientific management); SAMUEL P. HAYS, CONSERVATION AND THE GOSPEL OF
EFFICIENCY: THE PROGRESSIVE CONSERVATION MOVEMENT, 1890-1920 (1959) (natural resource
policy); DAVID J. ROTHMAN, CONSCIENCE AND CONVENIENCE: THE ASYLUM AND ITS
ALTERNATIVES IN PROGRESSIVE AMERICA (rev. ed. 2002) (1980) (criminal justice, juvenile justice
and mental health).
23. See, e.g., Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) (invalidating minimum wage
law for women); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905) (invalidating maximum hours law for
bakers). Even during the heyday of the substantive due process era, however, much Progressive
legislation survived. See, e.g., Bunting v. Oregon, 243 U.S. 426 (1917) (upholding maximum
hours laws for manufacturing); Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908) (upholding maximum
hours law for women). For general discussions of the Court's rationale, see HOWARD GILLMAN,
THE CONSTITUTION BESIEGED: THE RISE AND DEMISE OF LOCHNER ERA POLICE POWERS
JURISPRUDENCE (1993); ROBERT G. MCCLOSKEY, THE AMERICAN SUPREME COURT 100-08 (4th ed.
2005) (1960); ARTHUR S. MILLER, THE SUPREME COURT AND AMERICAN CAPITALISM 18-71 (1968).
24. In fact, this account may be overly generous to Langdell. As Jerry Mashaw points out,
administration was a feature of American government from its inception. See generally.Jerry
Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law: Federalist Foundations, 1787-1801, 115
YALE L.J. 1256 (2006) (challenging the conventional vision that federal administrative law
begins in 1887 with the establishment of the Interstate Commerce Commission). See FRIEDMAN,
supra note 5, at 329-49 (discussing the rise of administrative law and its regulation of business).
In its early years, Congress established the Departments of War, Foreign Affairs and Treasury,
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If American law began to diverge from Langdell's common law
curriculum in 1887, and if it had become palpably distinct from that
curriculum by 1914, the gap between the two is even greater today,
when the legislation of the Progressive Era has been followed by the
New Deal, the civil rights, environmental, and consumer protection
movements, and the passage of a wide range of additional statutes.
The advent of the administrative state in and of itself is one of the
most important events in legal history and, indeed, of world history in
general.25 It has displaced the larger part of common law at both the
federal and state levels. The national law that Harvard and other
leading law schools aspire to teach now consists of federal statutes,
supplemented by the generally extensive regulations of federal
administrative agencies. These statutes often preempt state law and
sometimes induce or compel states to draft parallel legislation. But
the obsolescence of the Landgellian curriculum does not depend on the
any strong assertion regarding the decline of federalism 26 because
states have been as assiduous as the federal government in displacing
common law with administrative statutes. To the extent that a
national law school wants to teach the consensus view among state
jurisdictions, it should be teaching the typical or model provisions of
state statutes and regulations, not the common law.
The advent of the administrative state has changed much more
than the content of the law, however. It has also changed the identity
of the lawmaker and the underlying conception of law itself. Judges
and struggled to define the President's removal power for the officers of those departments; it
established the Post Office as an operational executive agency, and the Patent Office as an
essentially independent one. Id. at 1276-77. During the course of the nineteenth century, state
administrative activity became sufficiently prevalent to receive generalized treatment from a
national law school in the same manner as the common law. CHASE, supra note 7, at 47-52. The
Progressive Era legislation thus represents an increase in the level and salience of the
administrative state, rather than a complete break with the past.
25. See REINHARD BENDIX, NATION-BUILDING AND CITIZENSHIP: STUDIES OF OUR CHANGING
SOCIAL ORDER 129-39 (2d ed. 1977) (comparing aspects of the modern administrative state with
the patrimonial structure of medieval Western Europe); MAX WEBER, ECONOMY AND SOCIETY: AN
OUTLINE OF INTERPRETIVE SOCIOLOGY 212-99, 956-1002 (Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds.,
Ephraim Fischoff et al. trans., 1978). See generally HENRY JACOBY, THE BUREAUCRATIZATION OF
THE WORLD (Eveline L. Kanes trans., 1976) (examining the development and growth of
government bureaucracy throughout the history of Western civilization); WOLFGANG J.
MOMMSEN, THE AGE OF BUREAUCRACY: PERSPECTIVES ON THE POLITICAL SOCIOLOGY OF MAX
WEBER (1974) (discussing the central issues of Max Weber's political and sociological works,
particularly his concern with the future of liberal societies in the face of rapidly expanding
bureaucracies).
26. I'm happy to advance such assertions, however. See MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L.
RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED
AMERICA'S PRISONS 149-203 (1998); Edward L. Rubin & Malcolm M. Feeley, Federalism: Some
Notes on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903 (1994).
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make the common law, at least as it exists in the Anglo-American
tradition. Thus, a student who wants to consult a primary source for
common law, whether that source makes or articulates law, would
look to judicial decisions. In the administrative state, however, the
leading lawmaker is the legislature, and the most important
subsidiary lawmakers are the administrative agencies that implement
these statutes. Langdell's idea of teaching law from primary source
materials was an excellent one, but to follow that idea for a modern
administrative state would mean having students read statutes and
regulations, not cases. In addition, administrative agencies, not
judges, have become the most important interpreters of statutes. This
is in part because they carry out many more adjudications under the
aegis of these regulatory statutes than the judiciary does, but even
more importantly because the agencies themselves interpret the
governing statutes through their regulations. In a 1984 decision,
Chevron, Inc. v. National Resources Defense Council,27 the Supreme
Court instructed reviewing courts to defer to agency regulations
unless they clearly violated the language of the statute. Yet even
without Chevron, the agency would remain the most important
interpretive body because most of its regulations never reach the
courts; there are too many of them, they are too complex, and
regulated parties often conclude that suing the agency is an
unproductive strategy. Thus, the institutional features of legislatures
and agencies, not the institutional features of courts, have become
crucial to understanding the modern legal system.
In addition to changing the identity of the decision maker, the
modern administrative state has changed our conception of law and
our understanding of its purposes and functions. Legal philosophers
have described this process as the positivization of law,28 but for
purposes of legal education, it is necessary to be somewhat more
concrete. As is often observed, judges promulgate common law by
means of analogical reasoning; that is, by comparing a particular legal
problem with similar problems that have arisen in the past.29 Of
course, this comparison must be guided by principles that are at least
27. Chevron, Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
28. See 1 HABERMAS, supra note 10, at 243-71; WEBER, supra note 25, at 217-26, 839-76; see
also NIKLAS LUHMANN, A SOCIOLOGICAL THEORY OF LAW (Elizabeth King-Utz & Martin Albrow
trans., 1985); Hugh Baxter, Autopoiesis and the "Relative Autonomy" of Law, 19 CARDOZO L. REV.
1987 (1998).
29. MELVIN A. EISENBERG, THE NATURE OF THE COMMON LAW 50-96 (1988); MARTIN
SHAPIRO, COURTS: A COMPARATIVE AND POLITICAL ANALYSIS 1-64 (1981); CASS R. SUNSTEIN,
LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 62-100 (1996). See generally KARL N. LLEWELLYN,
THE COMMON LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS (1960); Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits of
Adjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353 (1978).
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implicit in the process, and often consciously available to the decision
maker. Those principles, moreover, are regarded as embedded in the
inherited pattern of decisions over long periods of time, generally by
the operation of collective rationality or secondarily by cultural
development. Thus precedent, or stare decisis, serves as a basis for
rational decisionmaking as well as a source of legal authority. The
Socratic method that Langdell developed is based on this conception of
law; in essence, the professor asks the student to engage in the same
sort of analogical reasoning that judges do: to state the facts of the
case under consideration and then to explain how that case should be
resolved by equating it to, or distinguishing it from, prior cases on the
basis of the principles that guided the prior decisions.30 In the process,
the student is supposed to discern, again through reasoning, the
embedded principles that animate our legal system.
Statutory law and its implementing regulations are based on a
distinctly different conception of law. To begin with, prior laws,
whether enacted as statutes or developed by common law, are not a
source of authority in enacting a new statute or regulation. A new
statute displaces all prior statutes that address its subject matter, and
the most important jurisprudential question in this area is whether a
legislature can ever be deemed to have bound its successor.31 In
addition, statutory law also displaces, at least presumptively,
regulations enacted pursuant to its predecessor. Newly enacted
regulations displace prior regulations, subject only to questions about
their fidelity to the authorizing statute. Perhaps more importantly,
the concept of rationality in drafting statutes or regulations does not
depend on analogical reasoning, but rather on an entirely separate
mode of thought generally described as policy analysis. Its elements,
as traditionally identified, are to define the problem, specify a series of
potential solutions, test each solution to determine the one that solves
the problem best, and implement that best solution. 32 As a practical
matter, both legislatures and agencies often adopt less comprehensive
30. STEVENS, supra note 7, at 51-56; Weaver, supra note 2, at 532-33; see also LAPIANA,
supra note 5, at 97-99 (discussing competing views on the transition to the case method at
Columbia Law School); Kimball, supra note 5, at 71-77 (deriving Langdell's method through
examining his handwritten teaching notes).
31. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 61-66 (2d ed. 1994) (1961) (act of legislation is
authoritative; statutes persist if, but only if, subsequent legislation does not repeal them).
32. JOHN FRIEDMANN, PLANNING IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN: FROM KNOWLEDGE TO ACTION
144-56 (1987) (tracing the history of policy analysis); CARL V. PATTON & DAVID S. SAWICKI, BASIC
METHODS OF POLICY ANALYSIS AND PLANNING 52-65 (2d ed. 1993) (identifying the steps of the
policy analysis process); EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS
5-7 (1978) (establishing a framework for policy analysis). See generally STUART S. NAGEL, POLICY
EVALUATION: MAKING OPTIMUM DECISIONS (1982).
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methodologies, and they often take political considerations into
account. Even with these compromises and modifications, however,
the basic mindset in drafting positive law differs distinctly from the
mindset of a common law decisionmaker. This brings us back to the
threadbare rationalization that the common law curriculum teaches
students to "think like lawyers." Perhaps it does teach students to
think like nineteenth century common law lawyers, but it does not
teach them how to think like lawyers in the contemporary
administrative state.
Significant as the advent of the administrative state may be, it
does not exhaust the list of substantive changes that have occurred in
our legal system since the development of the Langdellian approach to
legal education. One enormously important trend is globalization.
Although international commerce certainly existed in the nineteenth
century, the legal work connected with it was sufficiently limited in
scope to justify the exclusively domestic focus of Landgell's
curriculum. Now all large, and most mid-sized, American firms in all
large, and most mid-sized, American cities do business involving
international transactions. International human rights, essentially
unknown in Langdell's day, serve as a major political issue and as an
increasing source of litigation. Law firm size has changed as well: ten
lawyers constituted a large firm when Langdell developed his
curriculum; a large firm today employs about one hundred times as
many lawyers. 33 In the nineteenth century, discovery was a minor
prelude to dramaturgical courtroom confrontations; today trials result
only when settlement negotiations based on the data gathered in
discovery fail to produce a resolution of the controversy. 34
The first-year, common-law curriculum simply does not reflect
the impact of the administrative state and these substantive changes,
among others. The failure to integrate these topics and their
attendant issues into that curriculum disconnects it from the basic
character of modern legal practice in a manner that betrays that
curriculum's original intention; namely, the valid expectations of
students, and the efforts of the faculty members who conscientiously
work within its boundaries.
33. FRIEDMAN, supra note 5, at 483-95; MARC GALANTER & THOMAS PALAY, TOURNAMENT
OF LAWYERS: THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE BIG LAW FIRM (1991); ROBERT SWAINE, THE
CRAVATH FIRM AND ITS PREDECESSORS, 1819-1947 (1948).
34. See generally CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS (6th
ed. 2002).
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B. Common Law and the Advent of Systematic History
1. Langdell's Mythology
Langdell's decision to base the law school curriculum on
common law went beyond his belief that common law was the primary
component of the legal system, both pragmatically and conceptually. It
also arose from his commitment to a more general conception of law
itself and a common law mythology extending back at least two
hundred fifty,years. Law, according to Langdell, must be coherent; its
provisions must fit together in a logical structure. Common law
displayed that quality of coherence in his view, and was, in fact, the
only type of law that did so. It alone was drawn from, and indeed
embodied, the enduring legal principles that constituted the rational
spirit of the Anglo-American legal system.
Apart from its philosophical appeal, this belief about the
common law served the important purpose of political justification.
Why should judges possess the authority to articulate legal rules that
the legislature has not enacted? And why, having been given this
authority, should they work so hard to fit their decisions into a
coherent pattern instead of dispensing what they regard as justice in a
given situation? 35 The answer that occurs most readily to us is that
they are appointed by democratically elected officials, and that they
strive to make their decisions coherent because they must replace the
discipline of being answerable to the electorate with the discipline of
being constrained by legal principles. 36 This answer obviously is an
afterthought-the concept of common law decisionmaking was
established long before democracy prevailed in the Western world.
Rather, the justification was that underlying principles were the
essence of the common law, and, that common law judges, in reaching
their decisions, derived both their authority and their decisional
constraints from the principles themselves.
Medieval thought regarded such principles as the work of God.
As such, judges, in applying those principles to specific cases, acted
with divine authority. This is well known as St. Thomas Aquinas's
35. This approach is sometimes referred to as Kadi-justice. WEBER, supra note 25, at 976-
78.
36. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986); RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY
(1977); JOHN ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW (1980); Owen Fiss,
Objectivity and Interpretation, 34 STAN. L. REV. 739 (1982); Frederick Schauer, Easy Cases, 58 S.
CAL. L. REV. 399 (1985); Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633 (1995).
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theory of natural law,3 7 but it is important to recognize the
sophistication of his construct. St. Thomas did not assert that all legal
rules were derived from natural law; natural law may tell us that
theft is a crime, but it cannot draw the exact line between theft and
conversion, nor prescribe the particular penalties that should be
imposed. These more detailed, pragmatic rules are human law, not
sacred but mundane.38 However, they are not merely arbitrary
exercises of power; the Universe is ruled by reason and human beings,
endowed by God with rationality, are both naturally inclined and
morally required to use reason to produce those purely human laws. 39
Custom, which Aquinas defined as actions repeated over time,
partakes of this same rationality and possesses the additional
advantage of familiarity, so that there exists a presumption against
altering it except by legislative enactment. 40
The secularization of philosophy and legal theory that resulted
from the Reformation and the Enlightenment undermined the notion
that divinely established principles guided the law, 41 but the idea that
common law was based upon the collective rationality of people acting
over time survived.42 Common law was thus regarded as containing
embedded principles reflecting the inherited wisdom of a nation's legal
culture. By the early seventeenth century, as J.G.A. Pocock points out,
"English lawyers were prepared to define common law as custom," 43
with all the claims to rationality that Aquinas had advanced. As a
result, the idea developed that there was such a thing as general
common law; that is, common law not tied to any particular
jurisdiction but derived from principles embedded in the entirety of
the Anglo-American legal system.44 Whether one wanted to link this
37. 2 ST. THOMAS AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Pt. I, Q. 90, Art. 4, at 995 (Fathers of the
English Dominican Province trans., Christian Classics 1981); see OTTO GIERKE, POLITICAL
THEORIES OF THE MIDDLE AGE 75-76 (Frederic Maitland trans., Beacon Press 1958) (1900).
38. 2 AQUINAS, supra note 37, at Pt. I, Q. 91, Art. 3, at 997-98. Of course, although they
cannot be derived from natural law alone, they must not conflict with natural law or they are not
laws at all. Id. at Pt. I, Q. 95, Art. 2, at 1014.
39. Id. at Pt. I, Q. 91, Art. 3, at 997-98, Pt. I, Q. 95, Art. 2, at 1014.
40. Id. at Pt. I, Q. 97, Art. 3, at 1023.
41. 1 HABERMAS, supra note 10, at 243-71; J.B. SCHNEEWIND, THE INVENTION OF
AUTONOMY: A HISTORY OF MODERN MORAL PHILOSOPHY 141-66 (1998).
42. J.G.A. POCOCK, THE ANCIENT CONSTITUTION AND THE FEUDAL LAW: A STUDY OF
ENGLISH HISTORICAL THOUGHT IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY 30-41 (1987). This view is
advanced not only for the common law, but for law in general, see EDWARD RUBIN, BEYOND
CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE MODERN STATE 197-203 (2005).
43. POCOCK, supra note 42, at 32.
44. See William Fletcher, The General Common Law and Section 34 of the Judiciary Act of
1979: The Example of Marine Insurance, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1513, 1516-27 (1984); Stewart Jay,
The Origins of Federal Common Law, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1003 (1985).
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wisdom to God-given natural law was optional, and increasingly
unimportant, because few post-Reformation thinkers thought that the
embedded principles of a common law system could be accessed by
faith. Instead, they viewed these principles as discernable through
reason, and if these principles happened to correspond with divine
commands, it was because the universe was rational, and reason was
an alternative and equally valid path to knowing God.45
This rather widespread view acquired a particular political
valence and emotional intensity in England. The English monarchy
was discontinuous because William the Conqueror had displaced the
prior succession of Anglo-Saxon monarchs in 1066.46 Since the
common law embedded the collective decisions of English legal culture
in its entirety, it extended back before the monarchy itself into the
Anglo-Saxon era.47 Sir Edward Coke invoked this notion to declare the
common law independent of, and superior to, the Stuart monarchy. 48
Nineteenth century Americans regarded Coke as the originator of
judicial review and one of the authors of English and American
45. This is not dramatically different from St. Thomas' view, since he also believed in the
rationality of the universe and its accessibility to human reason. The biggest difference is that he
also believed that principles of natural law, that is, trans-cultural rules for human conduct, could
be discerned directly, whereas later legal theorists, Blackstone, for example, thought that
rationality-driven principles were entirely embedded the common law of a particular culture, and
could only be discerned through the legal products of that culture. This, and not a belief in
human rationality, continues to distinguish those who believe in natural law, e.g., JOHN FINNIS,
NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS (1988); ROBERT GEORGE, IN DEFENSE OF NATURAL LAW
(1999); JACQUES MARITAIN, NATURAL LAW: REFLECTIONS ON THEORY AND PRACTICE (William
Sweet ed., 2001); LLOYD WEINREB, NATURAL LAW AND JUSTICE (1987), from those who reject it.
46. FRANK BARLOW, THE NORMAN CONQUEST AND BEYOND (1983); DAVID DOUGLAS,
WILLIAM THE CONQUERER: THE NORMAN IMPACT UPON ENGLAND (1964); FRANK STENTON,
WILLIAM THE CONQUEROR AND THE RULE OF THE NORMANS (Barnes & Noble 1967) (1908).
47. POCOCK, supra note 42, at 41-55.
48. See Dr. Bonham's Case, (1610) 8 Rep. 113b; 7 James I (Hilary Term) (C.P.), reprinted
in 1 THE SELECTED WRITINGS OF SIR EDWARD COKE 264 (Steve Sheppard ed., 2003)
(Parliamentary restriction on medical licenses contrary to common law and is therefore void); see
also Jentleman's Case, (1583) 6 Rep. Ila; 25 Eliz. I (Easter Term), reprinted in SHEPPARD, supra,
at 157 (King cannot abolish common law courts and cannot control decisions of judges he has
appointed); Penal Statutes, 7 Rep. 36b, 2 James I (Hilary Term) (1605), reprinted in SHEPPARD,
supra, at 241(Queen cannot release person from burdens of penal statute contrary to common
law); The Case of the Tailors of Habits & c. of Ipswich, (1614) 11 Rep. 53a, 12 James I
(Michaelmas Term), reprinted in SHEPPARD, supra, at 390 (royal charter prohibiting tailor from
practicing his trade conflicts with common law and is therefore void). Coke wrote a book about
William's succession whose theme, according to the custom of the day, is summarized in its title:
A seasonable treatise wherein is proved that King William (commonly call'd the Conqueror) did
not get the imperial crown of England by the sword, but by the election and consent of the people:
to whom he swore to observe the original contract between king and people (1689). In other words,
Coke not only argued that the monarchy was discontinuous, but that William owed his very
ability to rule on his explicit agreement to preserve the common law.
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liberty.49 Thus common law was seen as the repository of principles
that transcended politics and provided citizens with adamantine
rights that could withstand the political vicissitudes of any given era.
This mindset served as the conceptual basis of the substantive due
process doctrine that flourished in the United States during the late
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Undoubtedly the Supreme
Court justices, in articulating this doctrine, were motivated in part by
purely political preferences. 50 However, they also believed that the
common law was based on embedded legal principles that protected
people's liberties, and that the Constitution, through its Due Process
Clause, forbade the legislature from intruding upon of the operation of
these principles. 51
In basing the law school curriculum on common law, and in
doggedly resisting any effort to incorporate constitutional or statutory
law, Langdell was not only motivated by the dominance of common
law, but also by the reverential attitude that common law
commanded, the belief that it was the repository of both collective
rationality and Anglo-American liberty.
2. Pollack & Maitland's History
This mythology of common law did not become obsolete in 1886
with the advent of the administrative state, but remained
intellectually au courant until 1895, when Frederick Pollack and
Frederick Maitland published The History of English Law Before the
Time of Edward L52 Applying contemporary historical methods,
Pollack and Maitland discovered that the common law did not date
back before the time of William the Conqueror at all. Instead, it owed
its origin to the Angevin monarchy, and specifically to the monarchy's
efforts to assert its control over both the Anglo-Saxon and Norman
lords.
49. WILLIAM NELSON, MARBURY V. MADISON: THE ORIGINS AND LEGACY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
(2000); SHEPPARD, supra note 48, at xxix-xxxi; Allen Boyer, "Understanding, Authority, and
Will"." Sir Edward Coke and the Elizabethan Origins of Judicial Review, 39 B.C. L. REV. 43
(1997); Louis Jaffe & Edith Henderson, Judicial Review and the Rule of Law: Historical Origins,
72 LAW Q. REV. 345 (1956).
50. See, e.g., CHARLES BEARD & MARY BEARD, NEW BASIC HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES
299-302 (1960); ALFRED KELLY, WINFRED HARBISON & HERMAN BELZ, THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION: ITS ORIGINS AND DEVELOPMENT (7th ed. 1991); MILLER, supra note 23.
51. GILLMAN, supra note 23; Charles McCurdy, The Roots of Liberty of Contract
Reconsidered: Major Premises in the Law of Employment, 1867-1937, 1984 SUP. CT. HIST. SOC'Y
20; William Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement upon Styles of Judicial Reasoning
in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513 (1974).
52. FREDERICK POLLACK & FREDERICK MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW BEFORE
THE TIME OF EDWARD I (2nd ed. 1968).
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Throughout the Middle Ages, law was largely a local matter.
Each manor, town, barony, or county had its own law, while the
Church had a completely different law. Landowners regarded their
ability to establish the law within their domains and, not
unimportantly, to collect the fines for that law's violation, as one of
their most important rights. Virtually everyone-from the peasant on
the manor to the greatest noblemen of the realm-regarded the right
to be judged by his own law as equally important.5 3 After William
conquered England, he and his immediate successors were content to
leave the legal situation as it was. Following the twelfth-century civil
war between Stephen and Maude, however, Henry II, first of the
Angevin kings, decided to suppress dissension by displacing local law
in England with a system of royal justice that would be common to the
entire realm-a common law.54 To achieve this, he enacted a series of
statutes, or assizes, such as the Assize of Clarendon, the Assize of
Novel Disseisin, and the Assize of Northampton, as well as a number
of more informal, but nonetheless effective, instructions. 55 These
statutes were almost exclusively procedural; 56 they established a new
system of writs that required the defendant to appear in court,
brought land disputes within the ambit of the courts, created the jury
system for indictment and evidence, and established a new set of
remedies. As Pollock and Maitland state:
If we try to sum up in a few words those results of Henry's reign that are the most
durable and the most fruitful, we may say that the whole of English law is centralized
and unified by theinstitution of a permanent court of professional judges, by the
frequent mission of itinerant judges throughout the land, by the introduction of the
"inquest" or "recognition" and the "original writ" as normal parts of the machinery of
justice. 5 7
Henry was willing to let the judges develop the substantive
rules of law, provided that the law was uniform, that the monarchy
imposed this uniformity, and that the monarchy received the fines.5 8
53. See MARC BLOCH, FEUDAL SOCIETY 109-16 (L. A. Manyon trans., Routledge & K. Paul
1961) (1939); F. L. GANSHOF, FEUDALISM 158-60 (Philip Grierson trans, 3rd ed., 1964); FRANCES
GIES & JOSEPH GIES, LIFE IN A MEDIEVAL VILLAGE 172-94 (1990); POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra
note 52, at 13-15 ("In a famous, if exaggerated sentence, Bishop Agobard of Lyons has said that
often five men would be walking or sitting together and each of them would own a different
law."); W.L. WARREN, HENRY II 317-20 (1977).
54. HAROLD BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL
TRADITION 440-45 (1983); POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 52, at 136-38.
55. BERMAN, supra note 54, at 445-57; POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 52, at 136-73;
WARREN, supra note 53, at 324-61.
56. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 52, at 136; R.C. VAN CAENEGEM, THE BIRTH OF THE
ENGLISH COMMON LAW 40-44 (2nd ed. 1988); WARREN, supra note 53, at 339-46, 360-61.
57. POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 52, at 138.
58. BERMAN, supra note 54, at 458; POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 52, at 153-61
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As a result, the common law of England, although it owed its existence
to royal decree, obtained its content from the cumulative decisions of
judges.5 9
Pollack and Maitland's work, though, did not entirely
invalidate Langdell's specific beliefs about the common law. Even if
the common law did not extend back into the Anglo-Saxon era, it was
still some seven hundred years old, which is a lot of time for the
accumulation of collective wisdom. And even if Lord Coke's claims
about the common law's antiquity were mythological, rather than
historical, he truly was the conceptual founder of judicial review, and
the common law truly had been an instrument for the protection of
individual liberty.
What Pollock and Maitland did was domesticate common law,
denying it the status of being qualitatively different from other forms
of law and thus entitled to a distinctive position in the law school
curriculum as the very essence of law. Conscious governmental policy,
their work revealed, produced both statutory law and common law. 60
Common law's long gestation period and incremental development by
conscientious judges might lend some coherence, but it also might lead
to obsolescence, to a failure to reflect the policy preferences of the
electoral democracies that had more recently arisen. The common law
articulated and developed certain political liberties, but it came to be
recognized as far less important, at least in the United States, than
positive legal enactments, such as the Constitution or various statutes
such as the Civil Rights Act of 1867,61 the Civil Rights Act of 1964,62
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965.63
Supreme Court doctrine gradually reflected Pollock and
Maitland's demotion of common law. That common law had some
preferred status under the Constitution, that there was such a thing
as freedom of contract, for example, rapidly came under intellectual
59. These developments were summarized at the time, probably between 1187 and 1189, in
RANULF DE GLANVILLE, THE TREATISE ON THE LAWS AND CUSTOMS OF THE REALM OF ENGLAND
(G.D.G. Hall ed., 1965). Whether Glanville, the chief justiciar under Henry II, actually wrote
"Glanville" is an open question; in all likelihood, he did not. See BERMAN, supra note 54, at 457-
59; POLLOCK & MAITLAND, supra note 52, at 162-67; WARREN, supra note 53, at 298 n.1, 330.
Berman thinks it was Hubert Walter, Glanville's nephew and Archbishop of Canterbury under
Richard I. For present purposes, the important point is that Henry's contemporaries perceived
his reforms as sufficiently significant and comprehensive to have elicited a major restatement of
English law.
60. See HANS KELSEN, A PURE THEORY OF LAw 193-278 (Max Knight trans., Univ. of Cal.
Press 1967) (1934).
61. Act of Apr. 9, 1866, ch. 31, 14 stat. 27(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.).
62. Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
63. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
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attack within the legal academy and from the Progressive wing of the
Court itself. Because it served the political purposes of the Court's
conservative majority, the substantive due process doctrine that was
based upon this view survived another four decades; it was
definitively put to rest, however, in the 1937 case of West Coast Hotel
v. Parrish,64 and the 1938 case of United States v. Carolene Products,65
the latter of which advanced a new approach to constitutional
interpretation.
The idea that common law is embedded in our legal system, to
be discerned by judges as an exercise of their essential role, came
under an equally vigorous attack. Justice Holmes was particularly
clear and eloquent in noting that the common law was not some
"brooding omnipresence in the sky" but rather the exercise of
governmental authority to make law in a given area.66 He may not
have needed Pollock and Maitland to reach this conclusion, but he was
fully aware that their insights supported it. In Erie Railroad v.
Tompkins,67 for example, the Court held that law must issue from a
governmental source that has jurisdiction in that subject matter. If
the subject matter of common law, such as torts and contracts,
belonged to the states, then only state judges could make substantive
law in those areas, and the notion of a general common law that could
be declared by federal judges as readily as state judges must be
rejected.68 The Court decided Erie in 1938, the same year as Carolene
Products. That was quite a long time after the conceptual obsolescence
of both substantive due process and general common law, but it was
also quite a long time ago. If there was some justification for retaining
the predominant focus on the common law in the fifty-odd years
between the creation of Langdell's curriculum and 1938, there is much
less justification for doing so in the nearly seventy years that have
followed.
Recent scholarly efforts to rehabilitate Langdell have pointed
out that he himself did not subscribe to the Court's substantive due
process doctrine, and that he had a full appreciation of the
64. West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (holding a state minimum wage law
for women constitutional and overruling Adkins v. Children's Hosp., 261 U.S. 525 (1923) and
Morehead v. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936)).
65. United States v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 153 n.4 (1938). The famous Footnote 4
articulates this theory.
66. S. Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205, 222 (1917) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
67. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938).
68. See Stewart Jay, Origins of Federal Common Law (pt. 2), 133 U. PA. L. REV. 1231 (1985)
(tracing the historical roots of the common law controversy); Louise Weinberg, Federal Common
Law, 83 Nw. U. L. REV. 805, 805-09 (1989) (discussing the Supreme Court's jurisprudence on
federal versus state common law).
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legislature's authority to enact statutes that displaced the common
law.6 9 But to regard him as a positivist on this account, like Austin,
Weber, or Kelsen, is misleading. Here again, the passage of time is
obscuring the context in which a statement was made and making it
appear more modern. The understanding that judge-made law can be
displaced by the sovereign was widespread in the Middle Ages.
Virtually all legal scholars of that era recognized that a potential
conflict existed between will, as represented by the sovereign's
command, and reason, as represented by the gradual development of
judge-made law, and that the latter must yield to the former. 70 This
conceptual framework, which had important theological implications,
continued into the late nineteenth century. Because Langdell was
thinking in these terms, he could accept, and indeed endorse,
legislative superiority while rejecting positivism and insisting that the
common law curriculum not be besmirched by the study of statutes or
the Constitution. The reason is that the pre-modern view, in
identifying statutes and constitutions as projections of the sovereign's
will, denied them the status of law.71 Law was limited to rules for
human conduct that were based on reason and that possessed a logical
coherence by virtue of that origin. Of course, only law was worthy of
study in a university law school. Acts of sovereign will could displace
the law, but so could bribery, revolution, and social movements that
led to constitutional amendments. Like statutes and constitutions,
69. See LAPIANA, supra note 5, at 74-78 (noting Langdell's distinction between law as it is,
which is the concern of lawyers, and law as it should be, which is the purview of legislators);
Sebok, supra note 5, at 2078-87.
70. ANTONY BLACK, POLITICAL THOUGHT IN EUROPE 1250-1450, at 148-56 (1992); BLOCH,
supra note 53, at 109-20; JOSEPH CANNING, A HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT 300-
1450, at 21-25 (1996); Kenneth Pennington, Law, Legislative Authority, and Theories of
Government, 1150-1300, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF MEDIEVAL POLITICAL THOUGHT C. 350-
C. 1450, at 424 (J.H. Burns, ed., 1988).
71. While this may seem odd, we have not fully liberated ourselves from the medieval view
even today. Perhaps the leading jurisprudential work of the post-War era, Hart's Concept of Law,
defines law as a set of rules for the governance of human conduct. HART, supra note 31, at 38-4 1.
This is modern enough to include statutes, but Hart is after all a positivist, and he is willing to
relinquish the idea of law as reason to that limited extent. Id. Note, however, that Hart's
definition excludes such basic statutes of an administrative state as an appropriations bill, the
creation of an institution such as a national park or a military base, and a government subsidy to
a specific industry or corporation. Id. For Hart, as for Aquinas or Ockham, these statutes are
simply not law. Ronald Dworkin, writing after Hart, is even more restrictive. Law, he says, is
what a judge decides. DWORKIN, supra note 36, at 1. This enables him to realign the law with
reason, reverse Hart's partial modernity, and return to the medieval point of view. About mid-
way through the book, he realizes that he has forgotten about statutes, and comes up with the
Procrustean idea that statutes cannot count as law unless they display the coherence of judicial
doctrine. Id. at 176-84; see also EDWARD RUBIN, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND
LAW FOR THE MODERN STATE 197-203 (2005).
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these were worthy of study by political scientists, but they did not
belong in law school.
It was only after Pollack and Maitland's work, after the debate
about substantive due process, after the absorption of European
jurisprudence, and after the development of an indigenous school of
genuine positivism, that American legal scholars came to recognize
that statutes and common law both counted as law, that they were
both projections of governmental authority that differed in the mode of
promulgation and development, but not in their essential character.
This took some time, but by 1937, if not before, the medieval linkage
between law and reason had been broken.72 Legal scholars recognized
that statutes and the Constitution were as worthy of study as the
common law. This realization, although now widely accepted at the
theoretical level, has only slowly penetrated the quotidian practice of
scholarship, perhaps because judicial decisions are simply easier for a
law-trained person to study, or because, to paraphrase Holmes, logic is
so much more intellectually satisfying than experience.
In any event, whatever mental effort the legal academy has
applied to modernizing legal scholarship has been applied much more
intermittently to legal education, and hardly at all to the crucial first-
year curriculum. Upper-class courses deal with statutes, but often
only by studying judicial interpretations of them. And the first-year
curriculum remains captive to the refuted glorification of the common
law.
II. LAW AS NATURAL SCIENCE AND SOCIAL SCIENCE
A. Law as Natural Science
As is widely known, Langdell and Eliot did not justify their
approach to legal education solely on the ground that it corresponded
to the prevailing common law system of their day. The common law
system established the relevance and practicality of the curriculum, in
their view, but it did not justify its status a graduate-level university
program. Even the common law's claim to an internal logic that
72. See Williamson v. Lee Optical of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); United States v.
Carolene Prods., 304 U.S.144 (1938). These cases, ironically, established the "rational basis" test,
perhaps a final act of obeisance to the notion that law must be ruled by reason. Here, however,
"rational" does not refer to a coherent system based on general principles, but whether, as the
Court said in Carolene Products, "any state of facts either known or which could be reasonably
assumed, affords support" for the statute. Id. at 154. As is widely recognized, this means that
there is essentially no review of legislation absent some additional factor such as one of those
described in Footnote Four. Id. at 152.
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reflected age-old Anglo-American principles of law was not enough, for
those principles were the ones that any good judge would apply and
that any good, apprenticeship-trained attorney would argue. Thus,
this idea belonged as much to the ordinary practice of law as to legal
theory, and was certainly the prevailing view at Harvard Law School
before Langdell arrived. 73 Langdell's and Eliot's claim was that the
approach to law embodied in the Harvard curriculum was a form of
natural science. 74 One might be tempted to interpret this somewhat
startling assertion to mean only that it used the methodology of
natural science, but since Langdell saw this methodology as a means
of discerning general, objectively identifiable principles of law, he
really seemed to believe that his approach was natural science itself.
Langdell and Eliot meant a number of different things by
"science"; the word possessed a kind of magic in the 1870s that it has
not quite lost, even today. As Thomas Grey points out, one aspect of
their claim was the view, described above, that law was a system
whose specific rules could be derived from a relatively small number of
general principles that formed a coherent whole. 75 In the Introduction
to his casebook, Langdell declared that "[t]he number of fundamental
legal doctrines is much less than is commonly supposed; the many
different guises in which the same doctrine is constantly making its
appearance, and the great extent to which legal treatises are a
repetition of each other, being the cause of much misapprehension." 76
To qualify Grey's insight, the idea that the law was a coherent
system based on general principles was the standard view, and
certainly not original with Langdell and Eliot. What they added was
the idea that this view allowed legal education to adopt the same
approach as natural science; that is, an inquiry that would disclose the
principles that were the source of its coherence. Langdell also
recognized that these principles, like the principles of natural science,
could not be perceived directly. The legal scholar could only discern
them by studying their particular manifestations, just as the natural
scientist could only discern the universal law of gravitation by
observing the behavior of specific falling objects. Thus, a second aspect
73. LAPIANA, supra note 5, at 7-28; STEVENS, supra note 7, at 35-64.
74. CHASE, supra note 7, at 27-31; LAPIANA, supra note 5, at 55-78; STEVENS, supra note 7,
at 52-59; Thomas C. Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1, 13-39 (1983); Howard
Schweber, The 'Science'of Legal Science: The Model of Natural Sciences in Nineteenth Century
American Legal Education, 17 LAW & HIST. REV. 421, 455-464 (1999); Speziale, supra note 5;
Weaver, supra note 2, at 527-31.
75. Grey uses the term "conceptual order" for this feature, and defines it as the idea that
law's "substantive bottom-level rules can be derived from a small number of relatively abstract
principles and concepts, which themselves form a coherent system." Grey, supra note 74, at 8.
76. CHRISTOPHER LANGDELL, CASES ON CONTRACTS viii-ix (2d ed. 1879).
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of the legal science was that it was empirical; as Anthony Sebok points
out, legal principles were to be discerned by inductive, not deductive
reasoning. 77 Since Langdell believed that the only real law-the only
law that merited study as a science-was common law, this empirical
evidence was to be found in judicial decisions that had been published
in court reporters. As he famously declared, "the library is the proper
workshop of [law] professors and students alike; ... it is to us all that
the laboratories of the university are to the chemists and physicists,
the museum of natural history to the zoologists, the botanical garden
to the botanists."78
This effort to depict the study of law as a form of natural
science is sometimes attributed to Darwin's influence.79 Doing so,
however, once again confers a misleading sense of modernity on
Langdell's thought, and on the curriculum it generated. While
Darwin's theory of evolution was clearly one of the greatest scientific
achievements of the entire era, there is no direct evidence that
Langdell was familiar with it. If Langdell had a source for his
conception of natural science, it was probably not Darwin but Louis
Agassiz. Agassiz, who had come to America from France in 1848, was
teaching at Harvard when Langdell arrived in 1870.80 He was an
academic superstar, perhaps the most famous university professor of
his day,81 and his ideas were probably more familiar to Americans
than the relatively recent discoveries of a reclusive Englishman.
Indirect evidence supports this speculation, because Langdell's ideas
bear a much closer relationship to Agassiz's than they do to Darwin's.
Agassiz was an empiricist; he believed that nature's secrets
were unlocked by scrupulous examination of physical evidence. For
one class in his invertebrate biology course, he required every student
to hold and examine a grasshopper, and when one student's
grasshopper hopped away, he stopped the class and waited patiently
until it was retrieved.8 2 Langdell's idea that the library should be the
77. Sebok, supra note 5, at 2083-87.
78. Christopher Langdell, Harvard Celebration Speeches, 3 LAW Q. REV. 123, 124 (1887). As
Grey points out, this did not prevent Langdell from criticizing judicial decisions; once the general
principle was discerned, a particular decision could be treated as an inaccurate application of
that principle to the facts of the case. Grey, supra note 74, at 20. It was more difficult, however,
for Langdell to reconcile such a critique with the principle of stare decisis that, after all, lay at
the center of the common law method. Id. at 24-27.
79. See Speziale, supra note 5, at 2-4.
80. EDWARD LURIE, LOUIS AGASSIZ: A LIFE IN SCIENCE 351-90 (1988).
81. LOUIS MENAND, THE METAPHYSICAL CLUB: A STORY OF IDEAS IN AMERICA 97-116 (2002);
see also Schweber, supra note 74, at 436 ("Agassiz may have been the greatest institution
builder, publicist, and fundraiser for science this nation has ever known.").
82. MENAND, supra note 81, at 100.
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law student's laboratory springs from a closely related perspective,
and one can readily perceive the similarity between the students in
his classes holding their books of reported cases and the students in
Agassiz's classes holding their grasshoppers. But Agassiz could not
accept the idea that the empirical evidence he valued so highly would
reveal a stochastic, malleable world of the sort that Darwin has
depicted, and indeed, he remained a vociferous opponent of Darwin's
theory until his death in 1873. Instead, he insisted that the biological
world was composed of fixed, unchanging forms that had been
specially created, and he believed that empirical examination of
particular plants and animals would reveal the essential features of
those forms.8 3 Langdell's conception of science reiterated this ancient
and outmoded concept. By examining cases, he believed, the student
would come to perceive the enduring principles of Anglo-American law
that lay behind them.
To be sure, there are a few statements by Langdell indicating
that he thought legal principles had evolved over time.84 In this way,
he differed from Agassiz, and he was somewhat more sophisticated;
but to take these occasional references to evolution as evidence that
Langdell thought of law as malleable or continually changing once
again gives his ideas a false modernity by interpreting them out of
context. Agassiz believed that the fixed forms of the biological world
had been created by God, and that species of plants and animals were
God's thoughts manifested in the material world.85 Lawyers and legal
scholars in the generation prior to Langdell held similar beliefs about
the principles of Anglo-American common law, but Langdell, like his
post-Civil War contemporaries, adopted a more secular perspective.
He regarded the principles of common law as humanly created, and
this means that they had necessarily evolved; obviously, they had not
prevailed in Britain at the time the Celts painted themselves blue and
danced with the druids, or even during the centuries of Roman rule
that followed. But these principles had developed, as Aquinas
suggested, by the cumulative operation of human reason over long
periods of time, and having done so, they were fixed and permanent in
the legal culture that had created them. Howard Schweber has
described this attitude toward science as "Protestant Baconism":
83. Id. at 126-28; Schweber, supra note 74, at 446. This itself may be little more than a
restatement of Aristotle's theory of biology, for Aristotle had taken Plato's unchanging, supra-
sensible forms out of the heavens and embedded them in the material world.
84 LAPIANA, supra note 5, at 70-78.
85. MENAND, supra note 81, at 128.
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inductive reasoning from empirical observation to known principles.86
Langdell's views thus differed from Agassiz's, but only to the extent
necessary to acknowledge the difference between enduring biological
forms and enduring legal ones.
Langdell's notions about natural science were rather
antiquated by the standards of his own era, but this does not do
justice to the true obsolescence of his conceptual framework. Even if
his ideas about natural science had been the most advanced of his
time; indeed, even if these ideas had been equivalent to our own, his
claim that law was a form of natural science, or the milder claim that
it should employ the methodology of natural science, no longer makes
sense. No contemporary legal scholar would advance such claims.
Some scholars draw on natural science as a way to explain the human
behavior that law attempts to channel or control,8 7 and of course legal
rules in technical areas must take account of scientific knowledge, but
the claim that law itself is natural science can be consigned to the
same intellectual dust bin as phrenology, astrology and
iatrochemistry. Only rejecting natural science's claim to objective, or
mind-independent knowledge, as Kuhn and Feyerabend have
suggested,88 would rehabilitate this notion and Langdell obviously did
not have this in mind.
B. Law as Social Science
As discussed above, the idea that law is a type of natural
science is obsolete in its entirety. It became obsolete at the same time
that Langdell's beliefs about the centrality and significance of the
common law became obsolete, namely, the decades that followed
immediately after the Langdellian curriculum assumed its final form
and began dominating American legal education. The agent of its
obsolescence, in this case, was not the advent of the administrative
86. Schweber, supra note 74, at 459 (Langdell "retained the constrained inductivism of an
earlier period"). Schweber points out that this approach to science regarded it as part of a unified
system of knowledge that would confirm the truth of God's creation, as presented in the Bible.
Id. at 447.
87. See SEMIR ZEKI & OLIVER GOODENOUGH, LAW AND THE BRAIN (2006) (applying the new
science of neurobiology to the law); Owen D. Jones & Timothy H. Goldsmith, Law and
Behavioral Biology, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 405 (2005) (arguing that legal thinkers should seek a
greater understanding of human behavior); Owen D. Jones, Sex, Culture and the Biology of Rape:
Toward Explanation and Prevention, 87 CAL. L. REV. 827 (1999) (examining scientific
perspectives of sexual aggression and how they can impact the legal model of rape).
88. See, e.g., PAUL FEYERABEND, AGAINST METHOD: OUTLINE OF AN ANARCHISTIC THEORY
OF KNOWLEDGE (1978); THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (2d ed.
1970).
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state or the discovery of common law's true history, but a related and
essentially contemporaneous phenomenon: the development of social
science. We now recognize that the social sciences-economics,
political science, sociology, anthropology, and psychology-provide the
most useful analogies for the academic study of law in the sense, that
they, like law, are "human sciences." Moreover, the insights of these
fields can be applied directly to extensive areas of law, which is not
true for the natural sciences. This combination of methodological
affinity and substantive overlap has spawned the current style of
interdisciplinary research, which is rapidly becoming the leading
approach among American academics.
Underlying these important academic developments is the
more basic one that our entire conception of law has become
essentially sociological. Rather than being seen as a reflection of
trans-cultural or philosophic norms, as in the natural law tradition,
most scholars now regard the law as a product of culture, constructed
by a particular society and drawing its value from the role it plays in
that society. It is seen as the study of human beings, with all the
complexity, norm~ativity, and subjectivity that this study necessarily
implies.
The reason Langdell failed to adopt this modern perspective-
the reason he tried to assimilate law to natural science rather than
social science-is not that he was obdurate or ignorant, but because he
was a product of his times. When he devised the Harvard curriculum
in the 1870s and 1880s, there was virtually no social science in the
United States. The first significant American scholarship recognized
as modern social science, like the very first federal administrative
agencies and the very first historical analysis of common law, was the
product of the 1880s and 1890s. This is true for economics, political
science, sociology, and a variety of related disciplines.
Prior to 1870, economics, or political economy, was generally
regarded as a branch of moral philosophy. Francis Bowen, Alford
Professor of Natural Religion, Moral Philosophy, and Civil Polity was
Harvard's only faculty member in this field during the two decades
before Langdell's appointment. According to Bowen, Smith's invisible
hand reflected divine intervention in society:8 9 "[God] turneth [men's]
natural selfishness to good; and ends which could not be accomplished
by the greatest sagacity ... are effected directly and incessantly, even
89. PAUL BUCK, SOCIAL SCIENCES AT HARVARD, 1860-1920 24-25 (1965); Byrd L. Jones, A
Quest for National Leadership: Institutionalization of Economics at Harvard, in BREAKING THE
ACADEMIC MOULD: ECONOMISTS AND AMERICAN HIGHER LEARNING IN THE NINETEENTH
CENTURY, 95, 96- 100 (William J. Barber, ed., 1988).
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through the ignorance, the willfulness, and the avarice of men."90 In
1869, Eliot appointed the first faculty member recognizable as an
economist in the modern sense, Charles Dunbar. Dunbar, who began
teaching the year after Langdell, separated the Department of
Political Economy from philosophy in 1879.91 In 1876, he issued a
well-known condemnation of "economic science in America,"
excoriating his compatriots for having been so fixated on the
acquisition of wealth that they had contributed nothing to the growth
of knowledge in this area. 92 A new generation of scholars began to
remedy this situation in the 1880s and 1890s, and economics became a
real academic discipline in the United States. But this work was
limited to macro-economic questions such as trade policy, savings
rates, the proper balance between capital and wages, and the
sustainability of human populations.93 The powerful tools that
microeconomics would provide for analyzing commercial and legal
relationships would not be developed for many years, and even the
more modest insights of institutional economics, lay several decades in
the future.
Sociology and political science equally were undeveloped at the
time when Langdell and Eliot designed the common law curriculum.
To be sure, Herbert Spencer, a social theorist of sorts, just then was
taking America by storm.94 Whether this event should count as the
primordial appearance of political science and sociology in the United
States is uncertain; Talcott Parsons began The Structure of Social
Action with a quote that nobody reads Spencer any more. 95 The
90. Jones, supra note 87, at 98 (quoting FRANCIS BOWEN, AMERICAN POLITICAL ECONOMY
18 (1870)).
91. BUCK, supra note 89, at 25-32.
92. Charles Dunbar, Economic Science in America, 1776-1876, 122 N. AM. REV. 124, 124
(1876).
93. MICHAEL O'CONNOR, THE ORIGINS OF ACADEMIC ECONOMICS IN THE UNITED STATES
(1944).
94. Spencer toured the United States in 1882, and "was greeted everywhere with lavish
hospitality and accorded celebrity status." DAVID WILTSHIRE, THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL
THOUGHT OF HERBERT SPENCER 92 (1978).
95. TALCorr PARSONS, THE STRUCTURE OF SOCIAL ACTION (vol. 1) 3 (1968) (quoting CRANE
BRINTON, ENGLISH POLITICAL THOUGHT IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 226-27 (1962)). While
Spencer's evolutionary theory of society can be regarded as a positive, rather than normative,
approach-something he seems to have learned from Comte-his empiricism was of a very
general nature, and his concept of evolution owed more to Lamarck than to Darwin. J.D.Y. PEEL,
HERBERT SPENCER, THE EVOLUTION OF A SOCIOLOGIST 141-46 (1971); WILTSHIRE, supra note 94,
at 192-216. Spencer enthusiastically embraced Darwin's survival of the fittest, but his theory
was formulated before well before The Origin of Species was published, and Spencer never
abandoned the notion that acquired characteristics could be inherited. Id. In any case, the
normative implications of his work, specifically his evangelical faith in laissez-faire governance,
seem to have been responsible for much of his influence.
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concept of sociology, as a distinctive academic field that pursued a
positive and empirically-based analysis of ordinary people's behaviors
and structural relationships, seems to have emerged in the United
States during the 1880s and 1890s, in part as a result of Spencer's
influence. Lester Ward's first major book, Dynamic Sociology, used
Spencer's ideas about evolution, although Ward vehemently disagreed
with the lessons that Spencer drew from those ideas.96 William
Graham Sumner was a self-conscious disciple of Spencer's, and he
shared his laissez-faire predilections, but Sumner was more of an
academic, and certainly more knowledgeable and meticulous in
documenting social behavior. 97  With Franklin Giddings, 98  who
published Principles of Sociology in 1896, the field seems to have
progressed beyond Spencer and acquired the contours of a truly
empirical social science. The process was a rather slow one, however;
in 1891, Harvard taught its first course with the word "sociology" in
the title (an economics course), but it did not create a sociology
department for another forty years. 99
While the study of society as a distinctive academic discipline
was arguably new in the nineteenth century, the idea of studying
politics and government obviously was not; political theory was nearly
as old as the Western intellectual tradition. A staple of Greco-Roman
thought, it was well represented in college courses, and educated
people were probably more familiar with the political works of Plato,
Aristotle, Cicero, Plutarch, and Polybius than with the political
writers of their own time. 100 But the empirical study of political
96. LESTER WARD, DYNAMIC SOCIOLOGY: OR, APPLIED SOCIAL SCIENCE, AS BASED UPON
STATICAL SOCIOLOGY AND THE LESS COMPLEX SCIENCES (Greenwood Press 1968) (1883).
97. WILLIAM GRAHAM SUMNER, FOLKWAYS: A STUDY OF THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMPORTANCE OF
USAGES, MANNERS, CUSTOMS, MORES AND MORALS (Ginn & Company1940) (1907); WILLIAM
GRAHAM SUMNER, ALBERT KELLER, & MAURICE DAVIE, THE SCIENCE OF SOCIETY (1927) (edited
version of Sumner's lecture notes). Sumner was an influential teacher at Yale during the 1880s
and 90s, although the publication of his work came somewhat later.
98. FRANKLIN GIDDINGS, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIOLOGY: AN ANALYSIS OF THE PHENOMENA
OF ASSOCIATION AND OF SOCIAL ORGANIZATION (The Macmillan Co. 1914) (1896). Giddings's first
textbook came two years later, see FRANKLIN GIDDINGS, THE ELEMENTS OF SOCIOLOGY: A TEXT-
BOOK FOR COLLEGES AND SCHOOLS (The Macmillan Co. 1908) (1898). His best-known and most
comprehensive works were not produced until the 1920s, however. See FRANKLIN GIDDINGS,
STUDIES IN THE THEORY OF HUMAN SOCIETY (1922); FRANKLIN GIDDINGS, THE SCIENTIFIC STUDY
OF HUMAN SOCIETY (1924).
99. BUCK, supra note 89, at 19.
100. See ARISTOTLE, POLITICS (Benjamin Jowett trans., Franklin Library 1977) (1905);
MARCUS TULIUS CICERO, THE REPUBLIC; AND, THE LAWS (Niall Rudd trans., Oxford University
Press 1998); PLATO, The Republic, in COMPLETE WORKS 971 (John M. Cooper ed., G.M.A. Grube
& C.D.C. Reeve trans., 1997); PLUTARCH, LIVES OF TEN NOBLE GREEKS AND ROMANS (Edmund
Fuller ed., Grolier 1968); POLYBIUS, THE RISE OF THE ROMAN EMPIRE (Ian Scott-Kilvert trans.,
Penguin 1979).
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activity-the sort of work that forms the major part of modern
political science-was essentially unknown. Once again, the 1880s and
1890s saw the gradual development of something we recognize as
modern political science. Perhaps the first American academic to
accept the idea that politics should be studied by gathering empirical
data about actual human behaviors, rather than by moralizing about
general trends or structures, was John Burgess. Burgess left Amherst
College, an institution guided by the principle that truth "was
contained in the Bible," and became Professor of History, Political
Science, and International Law at Columbia. 10 1 His Political Science
and Comparative Constitutional Law joined Woodrow Wilson's
Congressional Government and W.W. Willoughby's Government and
Administration in the United States as the earliest examples of
political science scholarship in this country, despite the somewhat
moralistic tone that pervades these works. 10 2 A truly empirical
approach to politics and government, however, may not have appeared
in this country until Lord Bryce replaced Herbert Spencer as the
political scientist's favorite Englishman, and scholars such as Arthur
Bentley, Charles Merriam, and A. Lawrence Lowell came to
characterize the field.103 Lowell succeeded Eliot as President of
Harvard, and his social science background, as opposed to Eliot's in
natural science, gave him greater insight into the real sources of data
for the human sciences. In his 1910 speech to the American Political
Science Association, he said:
We are inclined to regard the library as the laboratory of political science, the
storehouse of original sources . . . But for the most purposes books are no more original
sources for the physiology of politics that they are for geology or astronomy. The main
laboratory for the actual working of political institutions is not the library, but the
outside world of public life. It is there that phenomena must be ... observed at first
hand. 104
Thus, students of politics learned a great many lessons in the
forty years after 1870, among them the idea that the real world, and
not a library, is the true laboratory of the human sciences. Legal
academics needed another seventy years or so to learn this, and they
have not yet applied those lessons to the law school curriculum.
101. BERNARD CRICK, THE AMERICAN SCIENCE OF POLITICS: ITS ORIGINS AND CONDITIONS 26
(1959).
102. JOHN BURGESS, POLITICAL SCIENCE AND COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (London,
Ginn & Co. 1893); W.W. WILLOUGHBY, GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF THE UNITED
STATES (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press 1891); WOODROW WILSON, CONGRESSIONAL
GOVERNMENT: A STUDY IN AMERICAN POLITICS (Meridian Books 1956) (1885).
103. See CRICK, supra note 101, at 95-155.
104. Quoted in id. at 104.
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C. Curricular Effects of Viewing Law as Science
From our present vantage point, it is not easy to envision the
conceptual landscape that existed in Langdell and Eliot's day, before
the advent of social science; indeed, our intellectual tools for
understanding any era in the past are themselves a product of our
social science orientation. 10 5 The implications of this essential
difference in outlook likely manifest themselves in a variety of
unexpected ways. One of the most readily apparent differences,
however, is that Langdell and his contemporaries tended to regard law
as a body of rules, rather than as a social practice. For them, the law
consisted of a set of definitive statements that could be found in
authoritative sources, specifically the Constitution, statutes and
judicial decisions. To determine the law meant to consult these
sources. To study the law, according to the curricular innovations that
Langdell introduced, meant to discern the principles that determined
good decisions and gave those decisions coherence. To improve the law
meant to alter or overrule judicial decisions that conflicted with those
principles so that the totality of decisions formed a conceptually
coherent unit. This framework permitted the analogy between the
study of law and the study of natural science.
In contrast, social science has taught us to regard law as a
social practice. It is a sub-system within society, populated by a group
of trained professionals who possess a distinctive conceptual
framework and set of discursive strategies. While law, which is itself a
pre-modern concept, may be understood as definitive statements by
authoritative sources, legal practice is the total set of behaviors that
are prevalent among those trained professionals. To study legal
practice, according to a modern social science orientation, is to observe
the totality of these behaviors. To improve the law means to alter it so
that it implements social policies determined by the empirical study of
society in general. Thus, it is important not only to know the case law
105. An illustration of how central social science insights are to a modern view of law is
provided by one of Langdell's critics, John Chipman Gray. In 1883 Gray wrote that 'law [is] not
at all like the natural sciences whose 'truths' and the best means of applying them are
independent of opinion.... [I]n law the opinions of judges and lawyers as to what the law is are
the law." LAPIANA, supra note 5, at 19. This struggles with the idea that law is socially
constructed and is best understood as a social practice. It states a naive positivism, but, even
more weirdly, positivism in which judges and lawyers are the sovereign authority, not an
executive or a legislature. No theory of jurisprudence, at the time or afterwards, would support
this view. Gray is right, of course, that law is not natural science, but wrong to say that it is
created by judges and lawyers. What he meant to say was that law is a social practice, that the
observed behaviors of lawyers and judges are one aspect of our legal system. But this is a social
science insight and Gray, like other Americans of his day, was incapable of such an insight
because American social science was only beginning to develop.
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regarding torts, but also to know how lawyers interpret that law, how
the law and the lawyers' interpretations affect businesses and private
actors, and what effects are best for society as a whole. It is important
not only to know the language of a regulatory statue, but also to know
how that language is interpreted by implementing agencies, private
attorneys, and the regulated parties, as well as the effect it produces
on those parties, and whether those effects are best for society
according to some policy objective. All these issues are central to the
study of law once we adopt the modern view that this study is a mode
of social science, a methodology that did not exist, but was about to be
discovered, when Langdell and Eliot developed the Harvard
curriculum.
One consequence of Langdell's lack of a modern, social science
orientation is the absence of transactional law from the traditional law
school curriculum. Non-lawyers tend to be astonished to learn that in
the well-known first-year course on contracts (it was Professor
Kingsfield's course, after all),10 6 the students never read, draft, or
negotiate a single contract. 10 7 It is equally astonishing to realize that
upper-class courses typically do not fill this lacuna and that students
graduate from law school without any exposure to this basic area of
law in which large numbers of them ultimately will practice. This
feature of the traditional curriculum cannot be attributed to a change
in substantive law since Langdell's time. Unlike administrative law or
international law, transactional law was just as prevalent in his day
as it is in ours, just as basic a component of the practice for which he
was preparing the students. But transactional practice was invisible
to Langdell because it is a social practice, not a set of authoritative
rules. He and his compatriots were simply unable to perceive the
features of a practice as an appropriate subject for study in a
university curriculum.
Rules, of course, do apply to transactional law. In Langdell's
day, although not now,108 they were common law rules, and these
common law rules constituted the first-year contracts course-
Langdell's own subject, as well as Kingsfield's-as they continue to do
to the present day. Learning these rules is of some value, but the rules
106. JOHN J. OSBORN, JR., THE PAPER CHASE (1970).
107. Edward Rubin, Why Law Schools Do Not Teach Contracts and What Socioeconomics
Can Do About It, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 55, 55-56 (2004).
108. Since Langdell and Eliot's time, much of the law governing contracts has been
statutory, largely the result of the Uniform Commercial Code that was adopted throughout the
nation during the 1960s. See Robert Braucher, Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 58 COLUM. L REV. 798, 798-99 (1958); William Schnader, A Short History of the
Preparation and Enactment of the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 2 (1967).
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have only a background or tangential relation to the realities of
transactional law practice. One can spend an entire career as a
transactional lawyer, for example, without ever seeing an offer,
acceptance, or consideration case, topics that loom large in the
traditional curriculum. The great bulk of transactional practice occurs
within the broad limits set by authoritative rules and consists of the
techniques and strategies by which lawyers negotiate agreements, the
patterns that these agreements assume, and the ways in which they
are subsequently interpreted and modified. To Langdell and his
contemporaries, these were grimy details which could only be taught
through a series of how-to prescriptions that did not belong in
university courses. The social science approach to law reveals them as
important professional behaviors that can be studied with the
powerful methodologies of economics and sociology. Legal scholars
have adopted this approach, and the empirical study of transactional
law probably is more common at the present time, and certainly more
conceptually important, than the doctrinal study of contract rules. But
legal pedagogy, still in thrall to the Langdellian worldview, has failed
to recognize this change.
One readily can recount other gaps in the curriculum resulting
from the failure to recognize that law is social science, not natural
science. Law schools do not study the contexts of legal practice, for
example-there are few courses that focus on law firms, corporate
counsel's offices, or government lawyering. Here again, the
Langdellian model suggests that such inquiries are beneath the notice
of university programs because they do not involve authoritative
rules; however, any modern idea of studying law would recognize the
centrality of these concerns and would provide the economic or
sociological methodologies for teaching about them in an intellectually
rigorous manner. Similarly, statutes are underemphasized,
particularly in the first year, because they do not yield to the sort of
doctrinal analysis still prevalent in law school; again political science,
economics, and other social science disciplines provide the best
approach to this increasingly important area of law.
Strikingly, legal scholarship has largely, if not fully, come to
perceive social science as the most relevant analogy for law and the
most productive source of methodological tools for its investigation.
The field remains heavily normative or prescriptive, to be sure, 10 9 but
109. See George Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 YALE L.J. 970, 995-97 (1981);
Edward Rubin, The Practice and Discourse of Legal Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1847-65
(1988); Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV. 167, 179-81 (1990); Pierre
Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801, 808 (1991); Mark Tushnet,
Legal Scholarship: Its Causes and Cure, 90 YALE L.J. 1205, 1208-15 (1981).
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its prescriptions are generally perceived as ways of changing an
embedded social system, not as abstract exercises in moral philosophy.
While it would be incorrect to claim that legal scholarship is social
science per se, a social science understanding of the legal system
underlies the field's descriptive and normative efforts. Its substance
and its personnel reflect this perspective. Substantively, legal
scholarship is increasingly interdisciplinary, deploying social science
methodology or insights in place of the doctrinal analysis that
prevailed during the half century after Langdell. Indeed, one finds an
increasing number of descriptive empirical studies in law reviews.
Among more traditional, prescriptive pieces, it is almost impossible to
write cutting-edge scholarship in any business or commercial field
without a working knowledge of economics, and it is increasingly rare
to approach public law topics without addressing political science
insights about the relevant institutional context. Not surprisingly,
legal academics find social science training increasingly important;110
in the last few years, a significant proportion of the entry level faculty
members hired by the thirty top-ranked schools have had a Ph.D. in a
social science field.' Thus, scholarship in law schools has recognized
the intellectual events of the past century and incorporated a new,
social science-based approach to law. Legal education, however, lags
behind.
III. EDUCATION AND LEGAL EDUCATION
One of the most obvious, and apparently uninformative, things
one might say about the Langdellian system is that it was designed as
a means of education. In fact, "education" is a far from self-evident
concept. Langdell meant something entirely different than we do when
he used that term, and his notion is sufficiently foreign to our modern
sensibility that it requires something of an imaginative leap to
recapture it. For Langdell, the student's rationality served as the basis
for education, so that the educational process consisted primarily of
developing a capacity for reasoning. I12 He recognized other mental
capacities as important, such as will, memory, or imagination, but he
110. For a criticism of this process, see Harry Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between
Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MICH. L. REV. 34 (1992) (arguing that the
emergence of what he calls the "law and" legal movements (e.g., law and economics), though
serving important legal functions, has produced side effects detrimental to legal education and
practice because many "law and" scholars "are generally disdainful of the practice of law").
111. Id. at 51; see MICHAEL O'CONNOR, THE ORIGINS OF ACADEMIC ECONOMICS IN THE
UNITED STATES (1944).
112. See THEODORE BRAMELD, PHILOSOPHIES OF EDUCATION IN CULTURAL PERSPECTIVE 321-
36 (1955).
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regarded these as the servants of rationality. The particular version of
this approach that developed in the nineteenth century was known as
the "doctrine of mental discipline."'1 3 It held that the mind was a kind
of muscle, and that exposure to certain subjects best trained the mind
and, more specifically, its capacity for rational thought." 4 Those
subjects, as it turned out, were the ones that had always been taught,
such as Latin, Greek, and mathematics, and the techniques used to
teach them were the familiar ones of drill and recitation.
It is easy to dismiss the mind-as-muscle notion as nineteenth
century pseudo-science, like phrenology," 5 and to see the doctrine of
mental discipline as a post hoc rationalization for educators to do the
same thing they had always done. In fact, the idea that the human
mind operates like a muscle probably was recognized as a metaphor at
the time, and in any case, made about as much sense as any theory
could have prior to the twentieth-century development of neurology
and electrical engineering. Although those who championed the
mental discipline model in the early nineteenth century advanced the
unsubstantiated claim that only traditional subjects provided the
requisite level of training,1 6 late nineteenth-century proponents were
more thoughtful in designing a curriculum that would achieve their
goals. Preeminent among these was Charles Eliot, who was appointed
chair of the National Education Association Committee in 1892 to
assess the course of study in American elementary and secondary
schools. 117 Eliot, who besides initiating graduate legal study at
Harvard had introduced the elective system for undergraduates,
believed that mental discipline could be achieved through a variety of
substantive studies and need not be restricted to the classics.
While the mental discipline movement may have used the
mind-as-muscle notion as a place-holding metaphor, and was willing
to contemplate curricular modernization, it took its definitive stand on
the assertion that education was a process directed toward the
student's rationality. In criticizing the traditional curriculum, Eliot
declared that "there has been too much reliance on the principle of
113. Id.
114. HERBERT KLIEBARD, THE STRUGGLE FOR THE AMERICAN CURRICULUM, 1893-1958 4-5
(2d ed. 1995).
115. See Pierre Schlag, Law and Phrenology, 110 HARV. L. REV. 877 (1997) (arguing that
Langdell's idea of "law as science" has flourished academically, though it was developed and
implemented in much the same way as was the now-rejected field of phrenology).
116. For an effort to provide a philosophical link between mental discipline and traditional
subjects, see BRAMELD, supra note 112, at 287-314 (suggesting that "the perennialist reacts
against the failures and tragedies of our age by regressing or returning to the axiomatic beliefs
about reality, knowledge, and value that he finds fundamental to a much earlier age").
117. KLIEBARD, supra note 114, at 8-11.
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authority, too little on the progressive and persistent appeal to
reason." 118 Thus, the notion that a law school need not teach
contemporary law, that it can rely on an obviously outmoded course of
study because it is teaching students to "think like lawyers," is not a
contemporary rationale. Rather, it is the doctrine of the nineteenth-
century mental discipline movement, ensconced by Langdell and Eliot
in the law school curriculum when they created it in the 1870s, and
preserved by modern legal educators who repeat this mantra without
recognizing its origin or reevaluating its underlying premises.11 9
The doctrine of mental discipline came under sustained attack,
a few decades after Langdell and Eliot had relied on it, from a rival
approach that became known as the child development movement.
The central idea of the child development movement was that
education should not be designed in light of the information that one
wants to convey, or by mental habits, such as reasoning ability, that
one wants to develop, but rather in light of the persons who were
being educated-that is, children. The leading proponent of this
approach in the 1880s was G. Stanley Hall, one of the founders of
American psychology,1 20 a prescient thinker but also an elitist and a
pastoralist,1 21 whose work probably owed as much to Rousseau as to
anything recognizable as psychology in its modern sense.1 22 It was
John Dewey who combined the insights of the child study movement
with the idea of providing students with the educational content
118. Charles Eliot, Wherein Popular Education Has Failed, 14 FORUM 411, 425-26 (1892),
quoted in KLIEBARD, supra note 114, at 9.
119. The actual classroom approach that Langdell initiated is generally described as the
Socratic method. In actual fact, it displays only a vague resemblance to the method that appears
in Plato's Socratic dialogues, but the use of this term accurately reflects the fact that this
approach is more closely allied to modes of thought that prevailed two thousand, five hundred
years ago than those of most contemporary educators. See ARISTOTLE, Politics, in 2 THE WORKS
OF ARISTOTLE 445, 536-44 (Benjamin Jowett trans. 1952). Aristotle does include physical
education and music appreciation in his educational program, however.
120. ERNEST KEEN, A HISTORY OF IDEAS IN AMERICAN PSYCHOLOGY 67-68 (2001).
121. E.g., G. STANLEY HALL, ASPECTS OF CHILD LIFE AND EDUCATION (1921); see also
KLIEBARD, supra note 114, at 11-1421.
122. Rousseau's major statement about education is EMILE, OR ON EDUCATION (Allan Bloom
trans., Basic Books 1979) (1762). For an analysis of EMILE, see ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN,
EDUCATION BETWEEN TWO WORLDS (1942). Although Rousseau is certainly not a psychologist in
the modern sense, and probably not even a founder of the field, he is certainly one of the first
thinkers to realize that children are essentially different from adults, and that they gradually
develop, rather than suddenly becoming rational beings who must then be trained and informed.
See generally PHILIP ARIES, CENTURIES OF CHILDHOOD (1962) (arguing that pre-modern people
had no separate conception of childhood). This notion had still not penetrated into American
education at the time Langdell developed the Harvard curriculum.
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necessary for the modern world. 123 Dewey, one of America's most
distinguished philosophers, supported this approach to education with
a comprehensive epistemology, 24  based on pragmatism and
coincidentally paralleling Husserl's phenomenology. 125
For Dewey, as for Hall, education is a developmental process,
closely linked to the development of the individual's capacities. 126 He
also agreed with Hall-and with Rousseau-that children are not
merely uneducated adults who can be brought to intellectual maturity
through either the infusion of information or mental discipline; rather,
they are beings at different stages of life whose capacities, interests,
and conceptual ability vary with particular stages. While he accepted
the important role that nature played in education, Dewey rejected
Rousseau's idea that education was a natural process. In fact, one
could say that while Dewey's psychological approach treats education
as a developmental process, it also treats development as an
educational process. 127 The mind, Dewey wrote, is not something
"complete in itself, ready to be directly applied to present material."128
123. See JOHN DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY
OF EDUCATION (1916); JOHN DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND EDUCATION (1938); JOHN DEWEY,
LECTURES IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION (Reginald Archambault ed., 1966); JOHN DEWEY,
MORAL PRINCIPLES IN EDUCATION (1909); JOHN DEWEY, PHILOSOPHY & EDUCATION IN THEIR
HISTORIC RELATIONS (Elsie Clapp, transcriber, 1993); JOHN DEWEY, THE CHILD AND THE
CURRICULUM AND THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY (4th ed. 1959); JOHN DEWEY, THE WAY OUT OF
EDUCATIONAL CONFUSION (1931).
124. In addition to the works cited in note 120, supra, see JOHN DEWEY, ART AS EXPERIENCE
(1934); JOHN DEWEY, HOW WE THINK: A RESTATEMENT OF THE RELATION OF REFLECTIVE
THINKING TO THE EDUCATIVE PROCESS (1933).
125. See VICTOR KESTENBAUM, THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL SENSE OF JOHN DEWEY: HABIT AND
MEANING (1977). For a general statement of phenomenology, see EDMUND HUSSERL, IDEAS:
GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO PURE PHENOMENOLOGY (W.R. Boyce Gibson trans., Collier-
Macmillan 1962) (1931). Even closer to Dewey's thought is the posthumously published EDMUND
HUSSERL, EXPERIENCE AND JUDGMENT: INVESTIGATIONS IN A GENEALOGY OF LOGIC (James S.
Churchill & Karl Ameriks trans., Northwestern Univ. Press 3d ed. 1992) (1973). Cf. JOHN
DEWEY, EXPERIENCE AND NATURE (1929). Husserl and Dewey were exact contemporaries; both
were born in 1859, and produced their major works during the same time, although. Dewey lived
somewhat longer (not surprisingly-he died at the age of 93). There was some contact between
these two schools of thought-Husserl was familiar with WILLIAM JAMES, THE PRINCIPLES OF
PSYCHOLOGY (1918), for example, see Hilary Putnam, Pragmatisim and Realism, in THE
REVIVAL OF PRAGMATISM: NEW ESSAYS ON SOCIAL THOUGHT, LAW, AND CULTURE 37, 39 (Morris
Dickstein ed., 1998) - but they remain relatively separate even at the present time.
126. Systematic analysis of the child's mind and conceptual abilities would not occur until
the work of Piaget, the earliest of which date from the 1920s. See, e.g., JEAN PIAGET, THE CHILD'S
CONCEPTION OF THE WORLD (Joan & Andrew Tomlinson trans., 1929); JEAN PIAGET, THE
CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY IN THE CHILD (Margaret Cook trans., Basic Books 1954); JEAN
PIAGET, THE LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT OF THE CHILD (Routledge & Kegan Paul 3rd ed. 1971)
(1932).
127. DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION, supra note 123, at 130-38.
128. Id. at 156.
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Rather, it is a capacity that develops as a result of the educational
process and in interaction with that process. From this, it follows that
the educational program needs to change as the student develops his
or her capacities, and it needs to change in ways that take account of
the particular developments the student has previously experienced.
Still another feature of Dewey's theory of education is the
interaction between the student and the subject matter. The subject
matter of education, in his view, is not a passive body of preexisting
facts that the student is required to absorb. "Abandon the notion of
subject-matter as something fixed and ready-made in itself, outside
the child's experience," he urged. 129 This is directly connected to his
overall epistemology:
"Perception is an act of the going-out of energy in order to receive .... To steep
ourselves in a subject-matter we have first to plunge into it. When we are only passive
to a scene, it overwhelms us and, for lack of answering activity, we do not perceive that
which bears us down."
13 0
Thus, according to Dewey, "it is only in experience that any
theory has vital and verifiable significance .... [A] theory apart from
an experience cannot be definitively grasped even as a theory."131
Dewey's epistemology and psychology combine to emphasize
the crucial role of motivation in the educational process. It is not
merely that knowledge will not be acquired unless it is meaningful to
the student; something will not even constitute knowledge unless it
possesses such meaning: "Only by wrestling with the conditions of the
problem at first hand, seeking and finding his own way out, does [the
student] think."'132 Moreover, "knowledge will not be meaningful, and
the student will not wrestle with the conditions of the problem, unless
he or she is interested in it; that is, unless he or she becomes actively
engaged with the problem because it connects to some life purpose,
129. JOHN DEWEY, The Child and the Curriculum, in THE CHILD AND THE CURRICULUM AND
THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY, supra note 123, at 1, 11; see also JOHN DEWEY, The School and
Society, in THE CHILD AND THE CURRICULUM AND THE SCHOOL AND SOCIETY, supra note 123, at
30, 31-34 (arguing that the child, rather than the teacher or the course material, should be the
"center of gravity" in the classroom, and therefore criticizing "uniformity of curriculum and
method"); DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION, supra note 123, at 158 (arguing that "[s]tudy is
effectual in the degree in which the pupil realizes the place of the [course material] he is dealing
with in carrying to fruition activities in which he is concerned," and that "[t]his connection of an
object and a topic with the promotion of an activity having a purpose is the first and the last
word of a genuine theory of interest in education").
130. DEWEY, ART AS EXPERIENCE, supra note 124, at 53.
131. DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION, supra note 123, at 169. The parallel with
phenomenology is notable: Husserl begins his introduction to phenomenology with the statement
that "[n]atural knowledge begins with experience and remains within experience." See HUSSERL,
supra note 125, at 45 (emphasis omitted); KESTENBAUM, supra note 125, at 25-40.
132. DEWEY, DEMOCRACY AND EDUCATION, supra note 123, at 188.
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some sense of its inherent possibilities."1 33 Thus, education is the very
opposite of mental discipline, which suggests an effort to overcome the
learner's will, to compel the learner to absorb material that seems
uninteresting or uncongenial.134 Dewey further noted, "The problem of
instruction is thus that of finding material which will engage a person
in specific activities having an aim or purpose of moment or interest to
him, and dealing with things not as gymnastic appliances but as
conditions for the attainment of ends. 135
While Dewey's approach to education-and to epistemology for
that matter-has been a matter of controversy, 136 the basic insights
that underlie his approach are central to nearly all theories of
pedagogy in the twentieth century. To rely on a model of education
that was designed in the 1870s, therefore, as the traditional approach
to legal education does, denies us the benefit of the entire range of
modern thought about the educational process and of the entire field
of modern psychology that informs this area.
One problem that results from reliance on such an antiquated
pedagogic approach is that legal education is not designed as a
developmental process. Each course begins with a definition of its
subject matter-whether torts, civil procedure, corporations, or
bankruptcy-then proceeds down to a fairly refined level of doctrinal
detail, and finally stops short of intensive inquiry into any specific
topic that would bring students to the advancing edge of scholarship
or practice. In effect, we are teaching three years of second-year
courses. Not surprisingly, to reiterate the familiar bromide, the
students are terrified in the first year, interested in the second year,
and bored by the third year.13 7 Although law students, unlike
elementary school students, are no longer developing in either their
physical or mental capacities, they generally arrive in law school with
almost no knowledge of the legal system and leave ready to begin
highly compensated and reasonably responsible work as professionals.
Thus, a substantial amount of intellectual development occurs during
the course of their three years. Virtually all modern theories of
education strongly recommend that the educational program should
133. Id. at 146-50.
134. Id. at 156-57.
135. Id. at 155.
136. See LAWRENCE ARTHUR CREMIN, THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE SCHOOL: PROGRESSIVISM
IN AMERICAN EDUCATION, 1876-1957 (1961); MERLE CURTI, THE SOCIAL IDEAS OF THE AMERICAN
EDUCATORS (1935); PATRICIA ALBJERG GRAHAM, PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION: FROM ARCADY TO
ACADEME (1967); KLIEBARD, supra note 114; "SCHOOLS OF TOMORROW," SCHOOLS OF TODAY:
WHAT HAPPENED TO PROGRESSIVE EDUCATION (Susan F. Semel & Alan R. Sadovnik, eds., 1999).
137. Weaver, supra note 2, at 561-62.
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change in basic methodology to guide and keep pace with a
developmental process of this sort.
A second problem is that the Langdellian notion of education
treats its subject matter as a pre-established set of rules or
methodologies that exists "out there" in a passive realm separate from
and independent of the students. This notion is entirely inconsistent
with the now generally accepted fact that what law schools teach is a
human product, something that it is socially constructed. 138 Even more
importantly for present purposes, this notion is inconsistent with the
learning process, which, as Dewey noted, is primarily experiential. A
basic understanding of legal practice and even legal theory can be
achieved only by actually performing legal tasks or observing legal
behaviors. Students who have never tried to draft a contract, or who
have never seen one being negotiated, have not merely failed to
receive training in a particular skill; they will not be able to
understand what a contract means, what purposes it serves, or how it
should be read by either the parties or an adjudicator. The traditional
curriculum provides students with one experience-intensive
questioning about the reasoning of judicial decisions. Law schools
have readily incorporated research seminars into the curriculum in
the sense that such courses are taught by the same faculty and given
the same weight as the Langdellian classes, but they have only
awkwardly tacked on other types of legal experiences, in the form of
skills training and clinical education. The self-contained, rule-based
Langdellian curriculum has closed them off from the twentieth-
century insight that learning comes from experience, and is itself an
experience.
138. The idea that the subject matter of legal education is socially constructed may sound
like a rejection of natural law. That would not be much of a problem for the approach suggested
here, since natural law is generally out of favor these days, but it is not even necessary to go that
far. The topic of this discussion is legal education, not law itself, and thus the statement about
social construction of law school's subject matter is one that any proponent of natural law can
readily agree with. Natural law, as Aquinas pointed out, consists of the moral principles that any
rational person can understand, and that God promulgates (since all law must be promulgated to
be valid) through human reason. 2 AQUINAS, supra note 37, at 997-98 (I-I, Q. 91, A.2). Clearly,
there is no need to teach something of that sort in law school. What needs to be taught in a
graduate professional program is human law, the complex rules of management and
implementation that few would regard as being dictated by natural law.
For a modern version of this relationship, see Paul Robinson, Robert Kurzban & Owen D.
Jones, Origins of Shared Intuitions of Justice (Univ. of Pa. Law School, Public Law Working
Paper No. 06-47, 2006), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=952726,
which discusses reasons why people, at least in the modern world, rate the relative seriousness
of crimes in such similar ways. Again, shared instincts of this sort, which may be inherent in our
mental framework, are not something law schools need to teach. What they need to teach are the
complex doctrines that implement these instincts.
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Finally, law schools have experienced difficulty motivating
their students, and engaging them intellectually by teaching in a
manner that makes sense to them, as Dewey and his successors
recommended. Of course, students have no lack of motivation
generally; they are highly motivated to enter the prestigious,
lucrative, and influential field of law, and law schools can draw upon
this motivation because their degree is a requirement for entrance
into the profession. This produces highly assiduous first-year
students, who want to earn grades that will provide them with the
most desirable employment opportunities and to reassure themselves
that they can function effectively as lawyers. Once these desires have
been satisfied (or frustrated), however, their motivation dwindles.
Faculty members often complain that all students want is a
credential, that once students have a job offer they lose interest in
their courses. But this is not surprising when law school curricula
have no rationale, particularly after the first year, exhibit no effort to
design programs that fit particular students' interests, provide very
little academic advising, and, as stated above, demonstrate no
noticeable progression from one year to the next. Only the degree
"connects to some life purpose, some sense of its inherent
possibilities." The result is that the students are motivated to get the
degree, but not to study the law.
IV. PROPOSALS FOR A TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY LAW SCHOOL
CURRICULUM
Some useful ideas for reshaping legal education follow
naturally from the foregoing discussion regarding the obsolescence of
its existing model. The momentous developments of the 1880s and
1890s were not a temporary disturbance or a passing fad, but rather
harbingers of a new era, the modern era in which we live. The
twentieth century did, in fact, occur. Those decades saw the
exponential growth of a national administrative state, the
displacement of common law, the recognition that common law simply
projects state authority, a new conception of human beings and
human society, vast bodies of social science scholarship based on that
understanding, new theories of learning, and new approaches to
education based upon those theories. The prescription for an up-to-
date, well-designed approach to legal education, simply put, takes
cognizance of these developments, rather than ignoring them or
rationalizing them away.
This is not a call for radical reform. It does not require that
legal education be reduced to two years, or increased to four, or re-
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unified with legal practice in some new form of apprenticeship. It does
not demand any change in the internal structure of the law school
curriculum; the mandatory first year and elective second and third
years remain. It does not require higher teacher-student ratios or any
other change that would affect the present financial structure of the
law school. It is merely a call to reassess the content of the present
program, to institute moderate changes that only sound extreme when
compared to the rigidity of the existing program. Of course, change
always involves costs, financial as well as psychic, but once the
transition is complete, a more relevant and theoretically defensible
curriculum will not require any more effort or financial resources to
deliver than the present one. This final Part outlines some of the
changes that would follow from a recognition of the economic, social
and conceptual developments that have occurred since the
Langdellian curriculum was implemented in the 1870s.
A. The First-Year Curriculum Should Cover the Modern Legal System
The mandatory first-year curriculum should provide students
with an introduction to the modern legal system. This sounds obvious,
but it requires fairly substantial changes in subject matter from the
existing curriculum. To be sure, students should understand the
nature of the common law and of judicial adjudication. But, at the
barest minimum, the advent of a national administrative state
suggests that students should also understand the operation of the
regulatory law, while the advent of globalization suggests that it is
important for them to be alerted, at the very least, to the existence of
international law. Additionally, a social science approach to the study
of law suggests that students need to understand the transactional
practices that do not appear in judicial decisions but form such a large
part of the lawyer's work. They also should appreciate the way in
which the regulatory state and transactional law combine in the
regulation of American business. If one were to walk into a middle- or
large-sized law firm these days (one of the sort that employs the
majority of law school graduates) one would find approximately one-
third of the lawyers engaged in litigation, only some of which involves
common law matters, another one-third engaged in purely
transactional work, and the last one-third engaged in regulatory work.
An up-to-date first-year curriculum should reflect that basic reality.
A revised curriculum of this sort, not the existing curriculum,
justifies the famous post hoc rationalization of teaching students to
"think like lawyers." Common law reasoning, admittedly, represents a
distinctive mode of thought, and one that students must learn, but its
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very distinctiveness signals its insufficiency. Such reasoning can be
described as an analogical approach that builds incrementally on
previous decisions, guided by general principles discerned from the
totality of those previous decisions. 13 9 But legal practice involves at
least two other equally legal and arguably more important areas:
regulatory law and transactional law. Regulatory law reasoning is
based on policy analysis-one must define the problem, identify
alternatives, choose the most promising alternative, implement that
alternative, and evaluate the results. 140 Agencies employ this mode of
thought, or at least assert that they employ it, and lawyers must be
familiar with it in order to represent an agency, or to represent a
private firm or individual who is dealing with that agency. Helping a
business decide how to comply with an agency regulation is more
likely to reiterate the agency's mode of thought than to employ
common law reasoning. 41 Transactional law consists of what Ronald
Gilson has called transaction cost engineering.142 The lawyer
determines how to implement an exchange between the client and
another party so that the surplus motivating the exchange is divided
in a manner most beneficial to the client and minimizes the client's
transaction costs. 143 This exchange involves a wide range of trade-offs,
transactionally-based techniques, and negotiating stratagems. It
rarely results in litigation, and, in fact, a large part of the lawyer's
role is to eliminate the uncertainties that generate litigation, or to
place the client in a situation where it can obtain the benefit of the
bargain by self-help or default, rather than by going to court.144
139. See sources cited supra note 29.
140. See sources cited supra note 32.
141. See IAN AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIVE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE (1992); Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal
Skills and Asset Pricing, 94 YALE L.J. 239 (1984).
142. Gilson, supra note 141.
143. See Ronald Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L & ECON. 1 (1960); Gillian K.
Hadfield, Problematic Relations: Franchising and the Law of Incomplete Contracts, 42 STAN. L.
REV. 927 (1990); Michael Klausner, Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81
VA. L. REV. 757 (1995); Oliver E. Williamson, Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support
Exchange, 73 AM. ECON REV. 519 (1983).
Another set of questions that a transactional perspective can address more effectively
involves the fairness of consumer contracts. See Michael I. Meyerson, The Reunification of
Contract Law: The Objective Theory of Consumer Form Contracts, 47 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1263
(1993); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. L. REV.
1173 (1983); W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of
Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529 (1971).
144. See IAN R. MACNEIL, THE NEW SOCIAL CONTRACT: AN INQUIRY INTO MODERN
CONTRACTUAL RELATIONS (1980); Marc Galanter, Justice in Many Rooms: Courts, Private
Ordering and Indigenous Law, 19 J. LEGAL PLURALISM 1 (1981); Benjamin Klein & Keith B.
Leffler, The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance, 89 J. POL. ECON. 615
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These additions to the curriculum not only will better prepare
students for the practice of law, but also will offer a number of other
advantages for both the students and the legal system as a whole.
Susan Sturm has described the current litigation-oriented curriculum
as the "gladiator model" of law, an approach where students are
taught that the lawyer's only role is as a litigator, and that courtroom
pyrotechnics are the pinnacle of professional achievement.145 A revised
curriculum would benefit students in their careers by signaling to
them that litigation is not necessarily the favored form of legal action.
The lawyer who is overly eager to sue the client's suppliers,
distributors, or regulatory agency does not do the client much of a
service and is not a very good lawyer. The introduction of regulatory
and transactional law into the first-year curriculum also serves a
career counseling function. That is, since many students are not
inclined toward litigation and will ultimately end up as regulatory or
transactional lawyers, it makes sense to introduce them to these areas
in their first year, rather than misrepresenting our legal system as
predominantly litigation-driven and leaving them to find their
preferred professional roles by trial and error.146
From the perspective of the legal system as a whole, Robert
Kagan and others have pointed out that American lawyers adopt an
unusually adversarial, litigation-prone stance compared to their
counterparts in other industrial nations. 47 It is not implausible to
attribute the unusual combativeness of American lawyers to their
training, and specifically to the first year of their training, which
inaccurately treats the law suit as the defining event in the legal
system.
Of course, there are other explanations for the adversarial
behavior that Kagan observes. These include the delayed development
of the American regulatory state, the American tolerance for
(1981); L.G. Tesler, A Theory of Self-Enforcing Agreements, 53 J. BUS. 27 (1980); Williamson,
supra note 143.
145. Susan P. Sturm, From Gladiators to Problem Solvers: Connecting Conversations About
Women, the Academy and the Legal Profession, 49 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POLY 119 (1997). See
also MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: HOW THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION IS TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY (1994).
146. Despite the litigious character of American society, the majority of lawyers, even in
large firms famous for their litigation practice, are not litigators. In a 1993 survey, large firms
reported that the proportion of their work constituting litigation varied from twenty-two percent
(for Shearman & Sterling LLP) to forty-four percent (for Gibson, Dunn & Crutcher LLP).
GLENDON, supra note 145, at 40-41.
147. ROBERT A. KAGAN, ADVERSARIAL LEGALISM: THE AMERICAN WAY OF LAW (2001). See
David G. Litt, Jonathan R. Macey, Geoffrey P. Miller & Edward L. Rubin, Politics,
Bureaucracies, and Financial Markets: Bank Entry into Commercial Paper Underwriting in the
United States and Japan, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 369 (1990).
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structured conflict, and the good old Turner thesis.' 48 Even if the
cause lies in factors that are entirely exogenous to the legal system,
however, such as fluoridated water, law schools might better serve our
society if they moderated America's legal adversarialism, rather than
inciting it.
A revised first-year curriculum also highlights the centrality of
social policy in the American legal system. We rely on law to achieve
many of our collective purposes, including economic regulation, social
justice, and national security, but we do not necessarily rely on
litigation in these areas. Rather, we address these issues through
legislation and administrative action and look to lawyers' skills as
policymakers, planners, and implementers. A first-year curriculum
that focuses almost exclusively on common law necessarily
underemphasizes or ignores these social policy functions. Though they
appear to some extent in upper-class courses, their absence from the
mandatory first-year program signals to the students that they are not
real law, that devising and implementing social policy programs is not
as important as litigating common law cases. Since we rely so heavily
on those with training in the law for our social policy programs,
underemphasizing the legal skills required for this task represents a
serious gap in our educational system.
A natural question, which would occur to non-lawyers as well
as lawyers, is the fate of the famous-or infamous-Socratic method
in a revised first-year curriculum. 149 This is ultimately a choice of
classroom technique that each faculty member needs to make, and the
suggested expansion of the first-year curriculum need not dictate that
choice. It is certainly true, however, that the Socratic method is closely
associated with Langdell's conception of common law as based on the
enduring but implicit verities of the Anglo-American legal system. As
described above, this conception is no longer plausible as a theory of
law, but its empty shell can still serve as the basis for a classroom
strategy, particularly considering the fact that few professors still use
the unalloyed, hairy-chested 150 version that characterized its earlier
incarnations. It seems unlikely, however, that this approach could be
extended to courses that did not center on allegedly coherent lines of
148. FREDERICK J. TURNER, THE FRONTIER IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1921) (existence of the
frontier had a decisive impact on the development of American civilization). Adversarialism
could be seen as part of the combative, individualistic spirit that flourished in frontier settings.
149. On the role of the Socratic method in the Langdellian curriculum, see sources cited
supra note 30.
150. It is my impression, based on my older colleagues' recollection of their legal education,
that the famous Socratic teachers of the past were particularly hard on women when they first
began to appear in law school classes.
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judicial decisions, such as a course introducing the regulatory state or
transactional law. This does not mean, of course, that teachers in
courses devoted to these subjects would need to abandon the question
and answer format that gives large classes their lively, interactive
character, but only that their questions would involve different kinds
of analytic skills.1 51
Of greater significance, perhaps, than the Socratic method, is
Langdell's reliance on appellate cases as teaching materials; that is,
on primary sources rather than secondary sources such as treatises.
This turned out to be a brilliant innovation: it replaced the treatises
that characterized European legal education and contributed even
more than the Socratic method to the liveliness of law school classes
by enabling students and faculty to experience legal decision making
first hand, and to question its wisdom or coherence.'5 2 Langdell's
explanation that cases are the law student's laboratory no longer
makes sense, but this is one of the rare instances where an existing
practice truly can be justified by a new rationale. Modern pedagogic
theories, such as Dewey's, strongly support exposure to primary
sources as a learning experience. What would change in a reformed
curriculum is the range of such materials used. The primary sources
for regulatory law and transactional law, as well as for international
law, modern litigation, and various other topics, are obviously not
limited to decided cases. One way of stating this is that students who
complete the traditional first-year program have learned to read a
judicial decision; students who complete the reformed curriculum
suggested here will have learned to read a case, a statute, a
regulation, a contract, a lease, a complaint, an interrogatory, and a
treaty.
B. The Upper-Class Curriculum Should Be Coherently Organized
While most law schools prescribe the first-year curriculum in
detail and the faculty collectively decides even minor changes in credit
or coverage, the organizing principle for the upper-class curriculum is
generally as follows: a bunch of courses. These courses are typically
151. As Kristen Dauphinais has pointed out, this notion of fostering different analytic skills
connects to another important theme in modern learning theory-Howard Gardner's concept of
multiple intelligences. Kristen Dauphinais, Valuing and Nuturing Multiple Intelligences in Legal
Education: A Paradigm Shift, 11 WASH. & LEE RACE & ETHNIC ANCESTRY L.J. 1 (2005). For an
account of Gardner's theory, see HOWARD GARDNER, FRAMES OF MIND: THE THEORY OF MULTIPLE
INTELLIGENCES (1983); HOWARD GARDNER, INTELLIGENCE REFRAMED: MULTIPLE INTELLIGENCES
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (1999).
152. Kimball, supra note 5.
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determined by negotiation between individual faculty members and
the associate dean for academic affairs. Faculty members display a
variety of motivations in these negotiations that include teaching the
course for which they have written a casebook, teaching a survey
course that will help them stay abreast of their field, teaching a
boutique seminar in their area of research, or making sure all their
classes meet between Tuesday afternoon and Thursday morning. The
associate dean generally wants to obtain coverage of a certain set of
courses that are deemed essential, largely based on student demand,
or of a list of such courses that was maintained by the previous
associate dean and handed down to the present one. Law schools
regularly require only one course in the second and third years,
professional responsibility, a generally resented requirement imposed
by the American Bar Association. 153 Many schools require a few other
courses that they regard as standard, but here as well, the bunch-of-
courses strategy prevails; law schools almost never combine the
required courses into a program with any element of coherence. 154
We live in an era of legal specialists, and social science
suggests that the best way to learn law, after an introductory first
year, is to study the practices of those specialists. Langdell's idea that
American law was a unified body of doctrine that could be explained
by legal principles whose number "is much less than commonly
supposed" is simply wrong in our contemporary era; legislation,
regulation, globalization, and complex business practices have
produced a tremendous multiplicity of legal rules and strategies that
cannot be fit into any simple, overarching pattern. Thus, after the first
year, students should be given the opportunity to study one area in
depth. They should be offered a series of courses that connect to one
another and combine into a coherent presentation of the area under
consideration. Each law school should offer a range of such
concentration programs, perhaps six to ten different choices depending
153. ABA Standard 301(a)(5): "A law school shall require that each student receive
substantial instruction in . . . the history, goals, structure, duties, values, rules and
responsibilities of the legal profession and its members." A.B.A., SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION
AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, ABA STANDARDS FOR APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS, 2005-06 EDITION
18-19 (2005), available at http://www.abanet. org/legaled/standards/2005-2006standardsbook.pdf.
154. A.B.A., SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, A SURVEY OF LAW
SCHOOL CURRICULA 15-17 (2004). The survey reports that apart from Professional
Responsibility, the most common required courses among American law schools in the upper-
class curriculum were Constitutional Law (52.8% of law schools), Evidence (46.4%), Business
Associations (21.5%), Federal Tax (16.9%), Criminal Procedure (14.3%), Trusts and Estates
(13.8%), Commercial Law (11.1%), and Trial Practice (7.8%). Since these are all in different areas
of law, and the last one in the list is required by only 7.8% of law schools, it suggests that very
few schools -fewer than 7.8 % in fact-have even two required courses in the same area.
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on the size of the school. The point is not to prepare students to
function as business lawyers, international lawyers, litigators,
regulatory lawyers, environmental lawyers, or intellectual property
lawyers the day they leave law school. Rather, a coherent presentation
of one area would be designed to give students a sense of the way that
modern law functions, of what lawyers do in their actual practices.
Broad introductions have their place, particularly in the first year, but
to keep introducing one area after another, reaching the same level of
detail, and never going beyond the fairly rudimentary level of
understanding achieved within the compass of a one-semester course,
is to misrepresent the complexity of modern legal practice, not only in
one area but in its entirety. Concentration programs of this sort need
only occupy approximately half of the upper-class student's
coursework. The remainder could be devoted to bar-oriented courses,
general courses in other areas, secondary interests, passing fancies, or
courses in other departments. But students should be given the
opportunity to study one area in depth and be encouraged to do so.
A coherently organized upper-class curriculum not only follows
the social science model of allowing students to study an area of
practice, but also allows the law school to incorporate the substance of
social science into its courses. There is, at present, a vast amount of
learning about the subject matter of law available in the work of
economists, political scientists, sociologists, anthropologists,
psychologists and scholars in related fields. By contrast, law as an
autonomous discipline, generating insights by analyzing the internal
coherence of judicially created legal doctrine, has largely run aground.
Offering students a coherent course of study in a given area of practice
will enable them to go beyond the mastery of legal rules and to explore
the insights that other disciplines provide. For example, in regulating
commercial behavior, law depends heavily on an understanding of
economics. In being implemented by institutions and attempting to
control the actions of institutions it depends on sociological, political
science, and economic insights about organizational behavior. In being
implemented by individuals, and attempting to control the actions of
individuals, it demands on sociological, anthropological, and
psychological explanations of individual behavior. Finally, as a branch
of governance, it relies on political science. Yet students can only
pursue these insights in a serious, productive manner when one field
of law is pursued in depth.
Interdisciplinary education is sometimes regarded as an
abstruse, theoretical excursion that legal academics, who chose to
avoid practicing law, impose on students with very different
motivations. In fact, social science is not only a means of studying law,
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but its subject matter is increasingly a component of legal practice.
Modern lawyers are not simply doctrinal specialists but knowledge
brokers; they translate complex bodies of information into legal terms.
The massive fact-gathering enterprises of contemporary litigation, for
example, involve information about the economic realities of a
business enterprise, or the behavioral realities of individuals and
organizations, and not only about legal rules. The contemporary
transactional lawyer facilitates a complex business deal, which often
requires detailed knowledge of the deal and the underlying enterprise
of the participants. Regulatory lawyers must understand the rationale
and process for government intervention in areas such as the
environment, resource management, employment relationships,
financial intermediation, health, energy, and a wide variety of other
fields to represent either the government or the group of private
enterprises that are subject to governmental regulation, which is to
say, all of them. The danger of a specialized, interdisciplinary course
of study in the upper years is not that critics will perceived it as too
academic, but that it will be perceived as too practical. While such a
curriculum will prepare students to practice in a given area much
better than the current approach, the primary point is to teach
students about law in general by enabling them to pursue one area
with the intensity and depth that is required to go beyond the level of
current one-semester year courses.
C. The Curriculum Should Progress from the First Year to the Third
Implicit in the foregoing recommendations is the idea that the
law school curriculum should progress from the first year to the third.
Instead of teaching three years of second-year courses-that is,
courses at the same level of detail-law schools should apply the
insight of Dewey and other progressive educators that education is a
developmental process. The first year should be broadly contextual; it
should provide students with a general picture of the legal system,
expose them to basic legal materials, and introduce them to the basic
modes of legal thought. Doing so not only introduces them to the
content of the modern legal system but also initiates a developmental
process that will carry through the remainder of their law school
education. One can, if one chooses, call this thinking like a lawyer-
and certainly a program that includes regulatory law, transactional
law, and international law is more entitled to advance this claim than
one limited to common law. But it may be more accurate to describe
this as learning to think like a law student; that is to say, to begin a
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developmental process that will produce a well-trained professional at
the end of the three year course of study.
Broader, more contextual first-year courses should serve two
functions for the upper-class program: a foundation and
comprehensive coverage. The traditional first-year curriculum claims
to be foundational because it teaches students a mode of thought-
that is, common law reasoning. Apart from the limited value of this
mode of thought for many upper-class courses, the claim is highly
abstract and overly conceptual. In terms of substance, the traditional
curriculum is uniform and non-developmental; first-year classes are
devoted to topics, such as contracts, torts, and property, that students
typically do not take again in any recognizable form. Instead, the first
year should provide introductions to broad areas of law that will be
examined in greater detail by upper-class courses. Thus, a course on
the regulatory state would be designed explicitly as a foundation for
administrative law, environmental law, securities law, and a variety
of other courses on specific regulatory regimes. A course on
transactions would prepare students for a series of more detailed
transactional courses such as mergers and acquisitions, international
business transactions, negotiation, and advanced contract drafting. A
litigation-oriented civil procedure course would not only provide a
foundation for complex litigation and federal courts, but would also
introduce the institutional features of the process that are relevant to
a wide range of corporate and public law courses in the upper-class
curriculum.
These same courses can provide comprehensive coverage of a
given field for students who have no interest in it and do not choose to
take any upper-class courses in that field. For example, constitutional
law courses in the first year often focus on structural constitutional
law (federalism, separation of powers, the commerce clause, and so
forth) and leave the Fourteenth Amendment and the Bill of Rights to
the second and third years. Again, this reflects a non-developmental
approach, where courses in each year cover a unique topic at the same
level of detail. Instead, a first-year constitutional law course should
provide a general introduction to the entire field that will not only
provide a framework for students who take upper-class courses, but
will also leave students who choose not to take any further
constitutional law courses with a general picture of the entire
document. To take another example, a first-year course on the
regulation of business, which introduces students to basic concepts of
property, money, capital, corporations, securities, bankruptcy,
antitrust, and tax policy, would serve as a foundation for upper-class
business courses. Students often take corporations in their third
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semester and learn a lot of rules about forming a corporation,
exercising voting rights, and piercing the corporate veil. But how
meaningful is all of this if the student does not have some preliminary
knowledge of bankruptcy and securities law? Why would anyone want
to create a corporation in the first place were it not for the functions of
raising money and avoiding liability? On the other hand, students who
have no interest in business law, and who took no other courses in the
area, would graduate with at least a rudimentary understanding of
the basic concepts and bodies of doctrine in this area.
In the upper-class years, the developmental approach
emphasizes the importance of organized, coherent concentration
programs that enable the student to pursue a particular subject area
in depth. It further suggests that these concentration programs should
progress from the second year to the third. The second year of a
concentration program could consist of a set of familiar-looking
courses in the field under consideration, typically one or two required
courses (administrative law in a regulatory law program, corporations
and securities in a corporate law program, criminal procedure in a
criminal law program, and so forth), plus a choice from among a list of
other relevant courses. By the third year, the program should progress
to offering students a more intensive experience of some kind. Such a
sequence could include a year-long research seminar; a course where
students are trained, carry out a real-world activity and discuss what
they have learned in a classroom setting; or a course in which they are
participant observers of a real world setting and simultaneously
analyze what they are observing. Courses of this kind are sometimes
called capstone courses because they come after students have taken a
set of specified second-year courses; the students can thus build on a
well-developed knowledge base. To be a properly intensive experience,
a capstone course should occupy between one-third and one-half of the
student's time during the third year.
It is no secret that law schools have lost the attention of their
third-year students. In informal conversations, law professors
typically attribute this phenomenon to the fact that many students
have received job offers after their second summer and simply are
biding their time in law school until they can graduate and start work.
This may be true, but educators should not succumb to fatalism of this
sort without trying alternative approaches. A third-year program that
consists of the same type of passive learning courses that the students
have been offered for two previous years can be predicted to induce
ennui. In addition, it is aberrant in educational terms. No other
graduate level program uses a passive learning model for third-year
students; medical students are in the hospital by their third year,
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Ph.D. students are working on their dissertations, and business
students have already graduated. Law students are tempted to
sleepwalk through their third-year courses because such courses are
too easy for them by that time, and they are induced to do so because
the format is uninteresting. Capstone courses, which give students an
opportunity to carry out some advanced project in an area of interest,
represent a more serious effort to hold the students' interest.
The result of this approach is that the courses in each year of
law school would look different. Visiting a class, one could
immediately tell, independent of the subject matter, whether it was
being offered to first-, second-, or third-year students. This is a
developmental approach to education, one that incorporates, rather
than ignores, the preceding century or so of thought about education
and the learning process.
D. Experiential Learning Should Be an Integral Part of the
Curriculum
Another central tenet of Dewey's educational approach,
reiterated by phenomenology and amply confirmed by modern
psychology, is the experiential character of learning and, indeed, of
thought in general. 155 This is a very general point, applicable to the
most abstract thought processes. 156 It has a specific application to the
learning process, in that learning itself is an experience and must be
treated as such if it is to be done effectively. This leads to the
conclusion, discussed above, that learning is an essentially
developmental process. But it also has the more concrete, literal
implication that real-world experiences provide a vivid and visceral
aid to learning, that many lessons are best learned by being observed
or applied in the settings where they will ultimately be used. 57 The
155. This view is not limited to phenomenological accounts, see, e.g., ANTONIO DAMASIO, THE
FEELING OF WHAT HAPPENS (1999), but also informs mechanistic and cognitive accounts, see
PATRICIA CHURCHLAND & TERRENCE SEJNOWSKI, THE COMPUTATIONAL BRAIN (1992); DANIEL
DENNETT, CONSCIOUSNESS ExPLAINED (1991); STEPHEN KOSSLYN, IMAGE AND MIND (1980). Even
psychological theories that emphasize the biological basis of thought do not claim that we
inherit, or can instinctively perceive, ideas, as Plato thought, but rather that biology predisposes
us to learn from and respond to experience in specific ways. See, e.g., STEVEN PINKER, THE
BLANK SLATE: THE MODERN DENIAL OF HUMAN NATURE (2002); MATT RIDLEY, THE ORIGINS OF
VIRTUE: HUMAN INSTINCTS AND THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (1996).
156. For Husserl's phenomenological account of scientific thought, see EDMUND HUSSERL,
THE CRISIS OF EUROPEAN SCIENCES AND TRANSCENDENTAL PHENOMENOLOGY 21-68 (David Carr
trans., Northwestern Univ. Press 1970) (1954).
157. In fact, recent studies of the brain reveal the surprising existence of "mirror neurons."
These are neurons that fire when "an individual performs simple goal-directed motor actions,
such as grasping a piece of fruit. The surprising part was that these same neurons also fire when
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University of Chicago Laboratory School that Dewey designed was
famous for its use of vocational skills to teach even abstract concepts.
Langdellian legal education, set in place before the
development of modern educational theory, restricted all of its
activities to classroom lectures. This virtually precluded experiential
learning. To be sure, the intense interrogation of a lawyer about
doctrinal arguments that characterizes appellate procedure can be
duplicated, at least to some extent, in the classroom setting, but this is
probably a post hoc rationalization for the Langdellian method, and in
any case, applies only to the this one, relatively rare aspect of legal
practice. As time went on, and the modern understanding of the
learning process became prevalent, legal educators sought ways of
incorporating the insights of educational theorist such as Dewey into
their educational program. The introduction of skills training and
clinical education resulted from this effort. Skills training is generally
delivered through classroom simulations, such as a mock trial, a mock
negotiation, or a drafting exercise. 158 Clinical education typically
involves the provision of legal services to people who cannot afford to
purchase them and who consider themselves fortunate to receive it
even from novice practitioners. 159
These experiential programs have been developed and refined
over time, often by teachers who take their educational mission very
seriously. However, these programs are not integrated with the
lecture classes, and they have been marginalized by their later
the individual sees someone else perform the same act." Giacomo Rizzolatti, Leonardo Fogassi &
Vittorio Gallese, Mirrors in the Mind, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, Nov. 2006, at 54, 56. The authors
suggest that this correspondence may be the feature that allows an individual to comprehend the
actions of another individual, thus facilitating the learning process, and they specifically note
that it tends to confirm phenomenology. Id.
158. See, e.g., STEVENS, supra note 7, at 213-15; Marshall W. Houts, A Course in Proof, 7 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 418 (1955); Howard L. Oleck, The "Adversary Method"of Law Teaching, 5 J. LEGAL
EDUC. 104 (1952). This approach seems to date from the 1950s, at least as an explicit educational
strategy.
159. See, e.g., CLINICAL EDUCATION AND THE LAW SCHOOL OF THE FUTURE (Edmund Kitch,
ed., 1969); PHILIP G. SCHRAG & MICHAEL MELTSNER, REFLECTIONS ON CLINICAL LEGAL
EDUCATION (1998); STEVENS, supra note 7, at 214-16; Robert J. Condlin, Clinical Education in
the Seventies: An Appraisal of the Decade, 33 J. LEGAL EDUC. 604 (1983); George S. Grossman,
Clinical Legal Education: History and Diagnosis, 26 J. LEGAL EDUC. 162 (1974); Philip C.
Kissam, Lurching Toward the Millennium: The Law School, the Research University, and the
Professional Reforms of Legal Education, 60 OHIO ST. L.J. 1965, 1993-2000 (1999); Charles H.
Miller, Clinical Training of Law Students, 2 J. LEGAL EDUC. 298 (1950); Spiegel, supra note 3.
The concept of clinical education gained currency in the 1930s. See John S. Bradway, Some
Distinctive Features of a Legal Aid Clinic Course, 1 U. CHI. L. REV. 469 (1933); Jerome Frank,
Why Not a Clinical Lawyer-School?, 81 U. PA. L. REV. 907 (1933). Implementation did not begin
on a significant scale until the 1940s and 50s however. See SCHRAG & MELTSNER, supra, at 3-7;
STEVENS, supra note 7, at 215-16.
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introduction into the curriculum and by the norms of the
professoriate. Typically, full-time clinical or skills educators are not
tenure-track faculty, while tenure-track faculty, under increasing
pressure to publish, rarely can devote the necessary time to preparing
and teaching a skills course or to running a live client clinic. Still more
problematically, the subject matter of skills and clinical courses is not
integrated with traditional lecture courses. 160 The clinic is a separate
physical facility in most law schools, often located off-site to be more
accessible to the clients. Most faculty members have only a vague idea
of what the clinic is teaching and how those experiences might relate
to their own materials. Skills courses, although physically located in
regular law school classrooms, are often taught by practitioners who
are equally isolated from the regular faculty. Externship programs,
where students spend a semester in a real-world legal setting, are
even more isolated from the rest of the curriculum; they are regarded
as individual experiences, and most of the faculty has no contact with,
or knowledge of, any student's externship activities. This isolation
sends a clear signal that students have no difficulty perceiving: skills
courses, clinical courses, and externship programs are separate from
and often secondary to their "real" legal education.
A modern approach to legal education would integrate
experiential learning into the regular educational program. Every
first-year course could have a skills component. When students study
transactions, they could draft and negotiate, as well as read, a
contract; when they study regulatory law, they could be asked to put a
simple initiative into statutory language and then draft an
implementing regulation; when they study civil procedure, they could
draft a complaint and an interrogatory. These are simple exercises,
corresponding to the generality of the first-year program. They are not
intended to produce the level of skill needed for practice, or even to
teach the skill itself, but rather to reify the classroom material. It is
one thing to decide, after reading a contract, that the language is
ambiguous, or that the judge misinterpreted ambiguous language; it is
quite another to try to express a simple transaction in unambiguous
contractual language of one's own.
160. In 1992, the American Bar Association issued the results of an extensive study
regarding legal education. A.B.A., SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR,
TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE PROFESSION: NARROWING THE GAP, LEGAL EDUCATION
AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT - AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM (1992). The 'MacCrate
Report," so named for the Chairperson of the Task Force, Robert MacCrate, strongly
recommended that law schools substantially increase skills training. Remarkably, it did not deal
with the relationship between the recommended skills training and the remainder of the
curriculum. Indeed, it appears largely innocent of any contact with educational theory, and
almost other-worldly in its focus on a set of defined, low-level practice skills.
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More elaborate simulations or real world experiences probably
would not fit into the first year and could not be accommodated
conveniently into a standard upper-class course. The most promising
means of achieving this integration would be through the
concentration programs described above. Instead of trying to integrate
a clinic or more elaborate skills training into a single course,
concentration programs could be designed to include these experiences
as part of a coherent educational plan. For example, a concentration
that focused on regulatory law might include semester-long
placements of students in state or local government agencies, with a
simultaneous or subsequent classroom course that analyzed the
students' experiences. A litigation concentration might include a live
client clinic where students represent clients in criminal or civil cases,
or a business law concentration might include a clinic where students
assisted small businesses in obtaining corporate charters. In each
case, the concentration might also include a course preparing students
to carry out these representations and then following up their
experience by having them assess it. Sophisticated clinical programs
already provide for preparation and follow-up of this sort. But these
functions should be carried out by courses that are integrated into a
larger concentration program, a program that treats experiential
learning as an integral part of its overall design.
CONCLUSION
The natural tendency to interpret past events in contemporary
terms has lent a misleading modernity to the law school curriculum
that C.C. Langdell initiated in the 1870s. This Article argues that this
curriculum is actually as antiquated as its date of origin suggests, and
that its underlying premises are truly alien compared with those that
nearly all of us maintain today. When Langdell developed his
approach to legal education, our national government carried out few
regulatory functions and our economy was largely self-contained. The
level of understanding about the origins of common law was not much
better than a troglodyte's understanding of the origins of the sun and
moon. There was no social science in the United States apart from a
superficial admiration for the now-abandoned views of Edmund
Spenser. People conceived of education in roughly the same terms as
Plato and Aristotle did, as a process that was exclusively addressed to
the student's rational facilities. One cannot blame Langdell for this; he
was working with what he had. But why should we model our system
on principles that are so seriously out of date? We live in a regulatory
state and a globalized economy. We have historical accounts indicating
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that the common law was a creation of the twelfth century English
state. Social science is now available for use as a methodological model
and as a source of substantive insights. We have pedagogic theory and
educational psychology that tells us how students actually learn.
This Article recommends that law schools respond to these
changes by creating a modified first-year program that corresponds to
the contours of contemporary legal practice and a new upper-class
curriculum that offers coherent, inter-disciplinary programs in specific
areas of law. It further recommends that the entire three years should
be designed so that the curriculum progresses from one year to the
next and incorporates experiential learning into its general structure.
These recommendations are only tentative, and there certainly are
other possible responses to the changes that have occurred since the
introduction of the Langdellian curriculum. The underlying point is
that legal education needs to change. It is time to incorporate all of
these developments, and the insights that they have produced, into
the law school curriculum. It is time to develop a law school
curriculum for the twenty-first century.
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